Published: January 27, 2026
This report is intended to supplement the U.S. Department of State Pakistan Travel Advisory and Pakistan Country Information Page.
Embassy & Consulate Contact Information
U.S. Embassy Islamabad
Diplomatic Enclave, Ramna 5, Islamabad
Telephone: +92-51 201 4000
Emergency Contact Information: +92-51 201 4000. Monday-Friday, 0800 – 1630.
U.S. Consulate General Lahore
50, Shahrah-e-Abdul Hameed Bin Badees, (Old Empress Road) near Shimla Hill, Lahore 54000
Switchboard: +92-42-3603-4000
Marine Security Guard Post One: +92-42-3603-4104
Hours of Operation: Monday-Friday, 0800-1630.
U.S. Consulate General Peshawar
11 Hospital Road, Peshawar Cantonment, Peshawar
Switchboard: (+92) 91-526-8800
Regional Security Office: Extension 8833
Hours of Operation: Monday - Friday, 0800-1630.
U.S. Consulate General Peshawar does not provide routine consular services.
U.S. Consulate General Karachi
Plots 3-5, New TPX Area, Mai Kolachi Road, Karachi
Switchboard: +92 (21) 3527-5000
Hours of Operation: Monday-Friday, 0800-1630.
OSAC Country Chapters
The OSAC Country Chapters in Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore meet periodically. There is currently no active Country Chapter in Peshawar.
Contact OSAC’s Asia team with any questions.
Pakistan Travel Advisory
The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses that travelers should reconsider travel to Pakistan due to terrorism and the potential for armed conflict.
Do not travel to Balochistan province for any reason. Extremist groups, including an active separatist movement, have conducted deadly terrorist attacks against civilians, religious minorities, government offices, and security forces.
Do not travel to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, which includes the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), for any reason. Active terrorist and insurgent groups routinely conduct attacks against civilians, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government offices, and security forces. These groups historically have targeted both government officials and civilians. Assassination and kidnapping attempts are common, including the targeting of polio eradication teams and Government of Pakistan security service (police and military) personnel.
Do not travel to the India-Pakistan border, including areas along the Line of Control for any reason. Militant groups are known to operate in the area. India and Pakistan maintain a strong military presence on their respective sides of the border. The only official Pakistan-India border crossing point for persons who are not citizens of India or Pakistan is in the province of Punjab between Wagah, Pakistan, and Atari, India. Travelers are advised to confirm the status of the border crossing prior to commencing travel. An Indian visa is required to enter India, and no visa services are available at the border.
Crime
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Islamabad as being a MEDIUM-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests. The U.S. Department of State has assessed Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar as being HIGH-threat locations for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Crime “C” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Pakistan.
The crime emergency line in Pakistan is 15.
Islamabad
According to available statistics, the crime rate in Islamabad decreased by 11% from 2023 to 2024. “Crimes against property” decreased in that same period from 9,406 cases to 8,470. However, security professionals should be aware that crime statistical data can be underreported or inaccurate. The U.S. Embassy uses residential guards, which is a common practice. Avoid ATMs that are isolated or not protected from tampering and examine them for skimming devices before use.
Street crimes (e.g., pickpocketing, purse snatching, mobile phone theft) are common. The frequency of these crimes, and the risk one faces, increases the further away one travels from the government-controlled city center of Islamabad. This area is commonly referred to as the Red Zone. In general, street crime is more prevalent in Rawalpindi, the city immediately adjacent to and interconnected with Islamabad.
Karachi
The efforts of the Rangers and the Sindh police have led to improvement in the security situation in Karachi over the past few years. However, there remains considerable risk from crime in Karachi and throughout the Sindh and Balochistan Provinces. U.S. nationals and interests are at risk of being targets of violence. According to the Citizens Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) statistics for July 2024 compared to July 2025, the number of violent crimes (e.g., murder, kidnapping for ransom) decreased slightly.
Cellular phone theft and motorcycle theft are common; year-over-year comparisons for July 2024 and 2025 indicate that both increased slightly. The use of skimming devices on ATMs has risen in the city, which police attribute to organized crime groups. Police and business contacts have expressed concern about emerging cases of fraud and counterfeit products from these groups.
Infrastructure shortfalls in Karachi have become a critical security challenge. A shopping mall fire resulted in dozens of fatalities likely due to insufficient fire exits and firefighting capacity. Seasonal flooding and unexpected heavy rains both overwhelmed existing drain infrastructure and led to deaths, extensive property damage and highest measured levels of mosquito borne illness.
Lahore
Comparing January-February 2024 to 2025, crime decreased in Lahore. Robberies decreased by 25% and street crime incidents (which includes snatching) declined by 51%. Carjacking, assaults, armed robberies, home/shop invasions, and other violent crimes are prevalent in many major urban areas; petty crime, such as theft of personal property, is also widespread.
Peshawar
The nature of extortion and robbery, especially those perpetrated by criminal gangs and terrorist organizations, can be particularly violent in KP. Reports of highway robbery, toll extortion, and illegal taxes are recurrent in KP, particularly in districts bordering Afghanistan. Crime statistics in KP are significantly underreported and likely inaccurate.
In 2025, RSO Peshawar tracked 70-75 terrorist-related incidents in Peshawar District, while KP government statistics reported 62 incidents. This represents only 4-5% of total provincial incidents, indicating that while Peshawar faces security challenges, the overwhelming burden of terrorist violence falls on southern and western districts of KP, particularly North Waziristan, Bannu, Khyber, Bajaur, and Lakki Marwat.
Business-Specific Crime Concerns:
Banking Sector: Multiple sophisticated robberies targeted financial institutions in 2025. On March 24, robbers plundered over Rs. 30 million from a Bank of Punjab cash van in Peshawar, holding staff at gunpoint on GT Road. The van driver was complicit in the robbery. In January, a government-run bank in Nowshera on GT Road was looted of over Rs. 10.8 million cash and 578 tolas of gold ornaments (worth Rs. 173.4 million), with robbers spending five hours inside after destroying the camera system and tying up the security guard.
Extortion: Extortion targeting businesses is a significant threat in KP. In October 2025, six civilians were burned alive in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, for refusing to pay extortion demands to militants In May, TTP issued extortion threats to Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) and Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) staff in Tank District, demanding "commission" payments and threatening mining/mineral contractors with 5% extortion plus PKR 5,000 per truck.
The Pakistani federal government and the KP provincial government remain committed to improving the rule of law and security in KP, though success has been limited outside major population centers. Avoid traveling on the streets late at night. Urban crime can be organized or opportunistic, involving individual criminals or groups. Pickpocketing, theft, and larceny are common on buses and trains at all hours.
Kidnapping Threat
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Kidnapping “K” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Pakistan.
Kidnapping remains a concern throughout Pakistan. In Pakistan, kidnap reporting encompasses crimes that have a broad base of motives, from kidnapping for ransom and sexual exploitation to property disputes and elopement. Extremist groups and criminals have targeted business owners and prominent families for kidnapping schemes to finance terror operations and profit through ransom. U.S. and foreign nationals working for non-government organizations have been targets, and U.S. nationals have been kidnapped in other countries and held in Pakistan.
U.S. citizens have been the victims of kidnapping, assault, or threats by family members in response to family disputes over property. Land disputes are common in Pakistan and are often difficult to resolve through legal channels. The U.S. Embassy and Consulates cannot protect personal property and cannot take sides in a legal dispute. Those wishing to purchase property should be aware of the risks, including not being physically present to oversee property. Those involved in a court dispute run the risk of having cases filed against them, and they may face arrest and imprisonment. In March 2019, two doctors, including one U.S. national, were kidnapped and murdered in Taxila. The suspects confessed to wanting to steal land owned by the U.S. doctor.
Authorities frequently do not catch or bring to justice groups that perpetrate kidnappings. Travelers who are being followed or threatened in any way should immediately go to a safe public place, such as a government building or police station. Vetting of personnel and proper personal security procedures remain the key to avoiding this kind of crime. Ensure any location you visit has exits accessible in an emergency, and do not make your movements highly public or predictable. Know the locations of and routes to the nearest police stations and hospitals.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province - Elevated Kidnapping Risk
Business personnel face particularly acute kidnapping-for-ransom threats in KP. In 2025, multiple incidents targeted employees of energy companies, contractors, and international organizations:
Energy Sector: In October, five Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited employees were kidnapped with their vehicle in Dera Ismail Khan. In September, five Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) employees were abducted in Bannu while repairing electric lines; they were released in November through local elder mediation. In December, three Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO) employees were injured during an attempted abduction in Bannu.
International Organizations: In September, three World Health Organization (WHO) polio monitors were kidnapped in Tank district and later recovered through local elder efforts. This incident highlights risks to international humanitarian and development personnel.
Contractors: In January, 16 employees of the Atomic Energy Mine Project were kidnapped in Lakki Marwat while en route to a uranium/plutonium mining site. In February, the Waziristan Chamber of Commerce President and two Customs officers were abducted near the Angoor Adda border crossing, prompting the business community to threaten street protests over deteriorating security.
Telecommunications: In September, three employees of CNEC, a private telecommunications company, were kidnapped in Nowshera. The engineer's family received a ransom demand of 5-7 million Pakistani rupees from an Afghan phone number.
Business owners, contractors working on government projects, and employees of strategic industries (energy, mining, telecommunications) should implement robust security protocols including armed security details, armored transportation, and coordination with local security forces.
Terrorism
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Islamabad and Lahore as HIGH-threat locations for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests. The U.S. Department of State has assessed Karachi and Peshawar CRITICAL-threat locations for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Terrorism “T” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Pakistan, indicating that terrorist attacks have occurred and/or specific threats against civilians, groups, or other targets may exist.
Pakistan experienced its deadliest year since 2011 in 2025, with terrorist attacks up 34% from 2024 and combat-related fatalities up 74%, the presence of foreign and indigenous terrorist groups poses a danger to U.S. travelers throughout Pakistan. Terrorists have targeted U.S. diplomats and diplomatic facilities in the past. Police Release Information on Thwarted Karachi VBIED Attack in December: On January 5, Karachi police released details of a major counterterrorism operation that thwarted a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack in December. During this operation, they seized a truck loaded with approximately 2,000 kg of explosives – including 60 plastic drums and five metallic gas cylinders – hidden in a compound in central Karachi, approximately 20 miles from the consulate. A Karachi police explosive ordinance disposal team safely neutralized the explosives. The police did not mention the intended target of the attack, but some media reports speculated about a popular local mall or the Karachi Stock Exchange. The police did not share information on arrests or other aspects of the investigation leading to the discovery of the vehicle, but attributed planning of the attack to the Balochistan Liberation Army’s Majeed Brigade. (COMMENT: The rumored targets would have been a significant departure from previous attacks by Baloch terrorist groups, which have mostly focused on security forces, Chinese nationals, or China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects. However, the advanced stage of planning at the time of intervention underscores how the ongoing insurgency in Balochistan can manifest in potentially major incidents in Karachi itself.
On November 11, 2025, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) detonated a suicide vehicle-born improvised explosive device (VBIED) outside district courts in Islamabad. The blast killed 12 and wounded 27 others in what is reported as the deadliest attack in Pakistan’s capital in nearly 20 years.
Violent extremist groups continue to plot attacks in Pakistan. Civilians, local military personnel, and police officers are all targets for terror groups in Pakistan who have ongoing ideological aspirations of violence.
Balochistan Province continues to experience elevated levels of violence, characterized by bombings, targeted killings, sectarian strife, extortion, kidnappings for ransom, and frequent demonstrations that can turn violent without warning. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Tehrik-e-Taliban of Pakistan (TTP, alternatively referred to as the Pakistani Taliban) are among the terrorist organizations active in the region; each has claimed responsibility for attacks in Balochistan. Various separatist groups and extremist members have claimed responsibility for deadly attacks.
Travelers must recognize a contrast when examining the security situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Province. The KP Police and Pakistani military maintain a heavy presence in and around Peshawar. These investments in physical and security infrastructure have translated into an improved security environment in and around Peshawar in recent years. Conversely, for example, fighting between Pakistani security forces and militants in North and South Waziristan remains a frequent occurrence. The security situation in Pakistan deteriorated further in 2025, as militant violence, concentrated in the frontier provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, has surpassed levels seen in 2024, which was one of the most violent years in over a decade. In 2025, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa reportedly experienced the largest surge in violence within Pakistan for that year.
While there have been no attacks against U.S. personnel since 2016, militants conduct weekly attacks against Pakistani security forces throughout Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to include Peshawar. These attacks include targeted assassinations, improvised explosive devices, and ambushes. While the Pakistani government has reduced the capability of militant groups to conduct complex attacks or large-scale violence, the threat of violence is still a significant concern for U.S. interests. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan further embolden militant/terrorist groups such as TPP and ISIS-Khosoran Province (ISIS-K). Lack of U.S. military presence the Afghan Taliban’s complacency in counter terrorism operations has given terrorist groups greater freedom of maneuver within the border country. This has allowed groups such as ISIS-K to grow their numbers. In addition to terrorism, crime-related killings and other violence is common in Peshawar and throughout Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
National and provincial resources are most available in Peshawar and other population centers, but less so in rural areas. To address this problem, Pakistan’s federal government has invested in infrastructure projects linking KP, and Peshawar in particular, to the rest of Pakistan.
Terrorists may attack with little or no warning, targeting transportation hubs, markets, shopping malls, military installations, airports, universities, tourist locations, schools, hospitals, places of worship, and government facilities.
Violent extremist groups within Pakistan continue to seek opportunities to attack locations where U.S. citizens and other Westerners are known to congregate or visit, including:
- High-profile public events (sporting contests, political rallies, demonstrations, holiday events, celebratory gatherings, etc.)
- Government facilities
- Schools and universities
- Shopping malls and markets
- Hotels, clubs, and restaurants frequented by Westerners and tourists
- Public transportation hubs/stations
- Minority neighborhoods
- Outdoor recreation areas.
Terrorists also target Pakistani officials, government facilities, security forces, and religious minorities.
We recommend you limit the frequency of travel and minimize the duration of trips to public markets, restaurants, and other public locations.
Attacks have included armed assaults on heavily guarded sites, including Pakistani military and police installations, and airports. Primary tactics of terrorists include suicide operations, shootings, and bombings (including vehicle-borne explosives and improvised explosive devices), while other actions include but are not limited to assassinations, carjackings, kidnappings, and assaults. The Government of Pakistan maintains heightened security measures, particularly in major cities, and these measures can vary from day to day. However, the U.S. government is aware of narcotics smuggled onto flights from Pakistan, which may indicate broader security vulnerabilities at Pakistani airports.
The U.S. Embassy and Consulates regularly assess security situations and restrict the movements of official personnel as necessary. Depending on ongoing security assessments, the U.S. Embassy and Consulates sometimes place areas such as tourist attractions, hotels, markets, shopping malls, and restaurants off-limits to U.S. government personnel under Chief of Mission (COM) security responsibility. The U.S. Embassy and Consulates prohibit personnel under COM security responsibility from using public transportation or taxi services. The U.S. Embassy and Consulates also prohibit such personnel from visiting houses of worship.
Official U.S. government personnel visiting Pakistan are authorized to stay overnight in certain local hotels in Islamabad, and some other areas of the country. Avoid hotels that do not apply stringent security measures.
Depending on ongoing security assessments, the U.S. Embassy and Consulates sometimes place areas such as tourist attractions, hotels, markets, shopping malls, and restaurants off-limits to official personnel. While threats still exist, terrorist attacks occur less frequently in major urban areas than other parts of Pakistan.
A variety of groups, ranging from extremist separatist elements to criminal gangs associated with local political organizations, have orchestrated bombings, assassinations, and other acts of violence. Foreign and indigenous terrorist groups thus pose a danger to U.S. travelers throughout Pakistan. Various separatist groups and ISIS members have claimed responsibility for recent deadly attacks. They have targeted police, security forces and foreign investment business partners.
This year has seen many attacks in Pakistan, including the following:
- In February 2025, the BLA claimed responsibility for an attack that left at least 18 paramilitary soldiers dead in Balochistan. Between 70 to 80 armed assailants had blocked a road and fired upon a vehicle carrying Frontier Corps paramilitaries.
- In March 2025, a train in Balochistan province was attacked and hijacked by militants, an attack claimed by the BLA; more than 60 people were killed.
- In April 2025, three members of the Balochistan Constabulary were killed, and 20 others were injured, in a bomb attack targeting a police bus in Mastung, Quetta province. The Baluch Raji Ajohi Sangar (BRAS) claimed responsibility for the attack.
- In September 2025, 15 people were killed and dozens of others were injured in a suicide bombing attack at a stadium parking lot in Quetta, Balochistan; hundreds of Balochistan National Party (BNP) members were gathered there. The Islamic State took responsibility for the attack.
- In November 2025, three suicide bombers attacked the main gate of the Federal Constabulary Headquarters in Peshawar, which is approximately one mile from the consulate. The attack killed the attackers, three security personnel, and wounded 11 other security personnel and civilians.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province
The security situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa deteriorated dramatically in 2025, marking it as one of the most violent years in the province's recent history. RSO Peshawar tracked 1,627 terrorist-related incidents in KP during 2025 - a 48% increase from approximately 1,100 incidents in 2024. The KP government reported 2,742 incidents for 2025, their highest annual total in recent years.
Casualties in 2025 were unprecedented: at least 625 Pakistani security personnel, 459 civilians, and 2,089 terrorists were killed according to RSO tracking.
Most Affected Areas: North Waziristan, Bannu, Khyber, Bajaur, and Lakki Marwat emerged as the five districts experiencing the most severe terrorist activity, collectively accounting for over 60% of all incidents in the province.
Peshawar District Security Assessment: While Peshawar District experienced significantly fewer incidents than southern KP districts, the sophistication and proximity of attacks to the provincial capital remained concerning. Notable 2025 incidents included:
- November 24: Three suicide attackers (all Afghan nationals) attacked the Federal Constabulary Headquarters approximately 3km from U.S. Consulate General Peshawar, killing 3 FC personnel and injuring 11+. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (TTP faction) claimed responsibility.
- May 11: Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) conducted a suicide bombing in Chamkani, killing 2 police officers.
- October 2: IED blast on Kohat Road (5km from USCG Peshawar) injured 4 police officers.
Dominant Terrorist Groups: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remained the most active terrorist organization, responsible for an estimated 70-80% of all incidents in KP. Other active groups include Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGB), Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP), and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA).
Emerging Threat - Drone Warfare: Militants used commercially available quadcopters modified to carry explosives to attack police stations, military posts, and civilians. RSO documented 90+ drone-related incidents in 2025, with particularly disturbing attacks on children including a December 11 incident where a quadcopter crash in Bannu killed 3 boys (ages 12, 16, and 20).
Critical Infrastructure and Business Threats:
Energy Sector: Systematic targeting of gas pipelines and energy infrastructure occurred throughout 2025. In July, militants damaged the main gas transmission line in Lakki Marwat supplying Punjab province. In August, an IED attack near Manjiwala village damaged a pipeline causing a gas leak. In June, a major natural gas transmission pipeline explosion near Wanda Arsala in Lakki Marwat caused a massive fire and required evacuation of nearby communities. In August, militants attacked a copper plant in North Waziristan.
Telecommunications: Mobile towers and telecommunications infrastructure were repeatedly targeted. In April, a mobile company tower was torched in South Waziristan, severing connectivity for thousands of residents.
Banking/Financial Services: In May, a United Bank Limited (UBL) branch in Mir Ali, North Waziristan was destroyed by IED blast. The building had been abandoned due to security threats, with staff relocated to Bannu.
Transportation/Logistics: In July, unidentified armed men hijacked three oil tankers with 7-8 crew members near Bannu. In September, militants set fire to a civilian contractor's vehicle transporting construction materials in South Waziristan. In December, two trucks transporting logistics for security forces were intercepted and set ablaze in South Waziristan, with both drivers abducted.
Polio Vaccination Campaigns: International health workers face significant threats. In September, three WHO polio monitors were kidnapped in Tank district. In October, a Levies constable protecting a polio team was killed in Swat. In December, a police constable providing security to a polio team was killed in Bajaur. These attacks severely hamper international health initiatives in the province.
Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Conflict Impact: The October 2025 border conflict significantly disrupted cross-border trade. The closure of Torkham crossing left over 200 trucks stranded, with Afghanistan's fresh fruit exports dropping 60-70%. Tomato prices in Pakistan increased five-fold. Despite Pakistani government claims that border closure would reduce terrorist infiltration, RSO data revealed no significant decrease in incident rates.
Primary Terrorist Targets in KP (2025):
- Security Forces (60-65% of attacks)
- Civilians (15-20% of attacks) - Including business owners, contractors, utility workers
- Infrastructure (8-12% of attacks) - Energy, transportation, communications
- Government Officials (3-5% of attacks)
- Polio Vaccination Teams (2-3% of attacks)
Business Security Recommendations: U.S. businesses operating in KP should implement robust security protocols including armed security details, armored transportation, coordination with local security forces, and careful route planning to avoid high-risk areas. The kidnapping-for-ransom threat is particularly acute for international organization personnel and contractors working on infrastructure projects. Vary routines to reduce predictability and avoid making movements highly public or predictable. Companies in the energy, telecommunications, banking, and construction sectors face elevated risks from both terrorist attacks and criminal extortion.
Political Violence and Civil Unrest
The U.S. Department of State has assessed all U.S. diplomatic posts in Pakistan as being HIGH-threat locations for political violence directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Civil Unrest “U” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Pakistan. Civil unrest can develop quickly without prior notice, often interrupting logistics and services. Avoid demonstration activity, as even those planned to remain peaceful have the potential to turn violent.
Peshawar
Civil unrest in KP Province can develop rapidly in response to international political or religious tensions, Pakistan's conflict with India, or events perceived to insult religious sensitivities or national sovereignty. In 2025, Peshawar experienced multiple large demonstrations, including an October 3 pro-Palestinian demonstration at USCG Peshawar with approximately 400 demonstrators that remained peaceful.
The environment remains unpredictable, and past incidents suggest unrest can develop with little warning.
Large protests can prove difficult to control and have led to citywide traffic disruptions, damage to property, and violent incidents. Avoid all demonstrations, as even those planned to remain peaceful have the potential to turn violent. The Pakistani government has previously disabled cellular phone and internet service during large demonstrations or periods of civil unrest, making it difficult for individuals to communicate.
Elections/Political Stability
Several potentially inflammatory political, religious, and social issues appear in each national election cycle. Avoid political demonstrations, as they can quickly become unruly or violent. The security environment around political elections remains very tense. Fears of violence by banned organizations like TTP and ISIS have at times significantly affected voter turnout during campaigns, especially in areas of KPK and Baluchistan. In Punjab and Sindh, violent clashes between supporters of rival candidates and political parties have caused deaths and injuries during elections. Due to the magnitude of this violence, law enforcement agencies have been perceived as lacking capacity and resources to provide required security for such events.
In February 2024, Pakistan held general elections. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)-backed candidates won the single-highest number of seats of any party; however, the second and third-highest vote getters—the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML (N)) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), respectively—reached a deal to form a government, with former prime minister Shehbaz Sharif named as the coalition candidate to lead the country.
Protests & Demonstrations
Planned and spontaneous demonstrations occur throughout Pakistan. There are usually small gatherings in front of certain government offices and the Press Club protesting an issue, and large demonstrations occasionally attract thousands of participants, often termed a “long march” by organizers. During large demonstrations or periods of civil unrest, the Pakistani government has disabled cellular phone and internet service, making it difficult for individuals to contact each other.
In the past, criminal gangs affiliated with political parties created much of the uncontrolled violence prevalent in Karachi before 2015, but this activity has become less significant in recent years. Transportation strikes and shutdowns can occur in major cities, often in reaction to political interests or in protest of government policies. Very large protests can prove difficult to control and have led to citywide traffic disruptions, damage to property, and violent incidents. In 2020, police and security forces effectively controlled these gatherings. There were no major acts of violence related to civil unrest. Most protests and demonstrations are anti-government in nature, with student issues, utility/fuel shortages, and political grievances as the most common reasons for protests. Anti-U.S. protests occur, but at a much lower frequency than anti-government demonstrations.
With respect to protests that could lead to violence against U.S. and western interests, blasphemy has been the most potentially inflammatory subject since 2020. In April 2021, protests by Sunni fundamentalist group Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP) turned violent after the Pakistani government refused to expel the French Ambassador in response to the Charlie Hebdo cartoons’ republishing in France. The government subsequently banned the group, and arrested and jailed hundreds of its members, including its leader. Five police officers were killed and more than 800 were injured, according to the Pakistani Interior Ministry.
Islamabad
In recent years, huge crowds of protestors representing political opposition groups have organized to demonstrate against the presiding Pakistani government. Large crowds numbering in the thousands have taken to the streets to march on key Islamabad roads, intersections, and landmarks. In anticipation of significant numbers of demonstrators, Islamabad police mobilize quickly with additional security forces and cordon off key terrain, roads, and sensitive government buildings. Transportation disruption is highly likely.
Karachi
While Islamabad is the most common place to take large demonstrations, Karachi also experiences “long marches.” In these cases, police have demonstrated the capability to mobilize quickly and have been effective in protecting diplomatic facilities and Pakistani government buildings in Karachi.
Karachi has seen an increase in the number of demonstrations protesting the infrastructure conditions in the city. The mall fire and the flood response have resulted in large public responses.
Lahore
Demonstrations and transportation congestion are common occurrences in Lahore and rural Punjab. In one recent rally in August, more than 300 people were arrested prior to a scheduled protest and then another 120 people were arrested during the protest calling for the release from prison for former prime minister Imran Khan.
In October a hardline religious political party launched a protest of 8,000-10,000 people in Lahore aiming to reach Islamabad and stage an anti-Israel demonstration outside the U.S. embassy, in solidarity with Palestinians. As security forces blocked major routes and attempted to stop the march, violent clashes erupted between police and the protesters in and around Lahore, leaving several people dead, dozens injured, and hundreds of protesters arrested. The unrest prompted a broad government crackdown, and extended bans on public gatherings.
Peshawar
In 2020, international political or religious tensions triggered several instances of civil unrest in KP Province. Often, they were in response to Pakistan’s conflict with India. The environment remains unpredictable, however, as past incidents suggest unrest can develop rapidly in the wake of events perceived to insult religious sensitivities or national sovereignty.
Anti-U.S./Anti-Western Sentiment
Terror groups have in the past targeted U.S. government personnel, its facilities, and Western organizations, including businesses in Pakistan. The U.S. Embassy recommends good security practices such as varying routines to reduce predictability and avoiding large crowds and demonstrations.
Law Enforcement
Pakistan has numerous security forces with slightly different jurisdictions. Local police are under the jurisdiction of provincial governments. Paramilitary organizations – including the Frontier Corps, which operates in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including the FATA, and the Rangers, which operate in Sindh and Punjab – provide security services under the authority of the Interior Ministry. The Frontier Corps’ primary mission is the security of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and the Corps reports to the Interior Ministry in peacetime and the army in times of conflict. The military plays a role in domestic security, including as the lead security agency in many areas of the former FATA. While military and intelligence services officially report to civilian authorities, they operate independently and without effective civilian oversight or control. There have been reports that members of the security forces committed numerous abuses.
Islamabad
While Islamabad has a large police force, resource constraints affect the efficacy of police operations. Low salaries and a lack of equipment are pervasive issues throughout the country. Despite these challenges, authorities devote significant resources to government buildings in Islamabad. Police corruption is an issue throughout Pakistan, but is significantly less of a problem in Islamabad.
Karachi
The efficacy of police services in Karachi is diminished by a lack of training and resources; police also receive relatively low salaries. As a result, political influence and bribery may impact the conduct of investigations, arrests, and prosecutions. Nonetheless, the Sindh force of the Pakistan Rangers has significantly diminished the capabilities of militant groups in the province. While the Rangers were present in Karachi prior to 2015, the Rangers and police used their increased authority under the 2015 National Action Plan (NAP) to focus on counterterrorism following a 2014 attack on an army school in Peshawar that killed over 130 children. The decline in the threat posed by militant groups in the province is attributed to their elevated level of enforcement activity.
Lahore
The Punjab Police is the largest police force in Pakistan, numbering over 200,000 active members. The Punjab Police clearly lack funds, resources, and training along with the rest of the Pakistani Police Services. Police resources and service remain well below U.S. standards, though the government is working to improve the situation with computerization and modernization. As of 2026, approximately 8,000 surveillance cameras monitor Lahore under the Punjab “Safe City” Project, to include a recent addition of 30 drone cameras, all part of a nationwide project. The system features a 24-hour command center where police officials monitor various areas of the city, looking for criminal or terrorist activities. These cameras also monitor traffic, with violators receiving mailed violations based on license plate numbers.
Peshawar
The security agencies in northwest Pakistan comprise civilian and military forces. Security forces are largely professional but lack equipment, communications technology, and training. In general, police response to criminal incidents is inconsistent. Police and government forces are common targets of terrorist attacks - in 2025, at least 625 Pakistani security personnel were killed in KP province, with police accounting for approximately 200-250 of these deaths.
The local threat environment requires authorities to prioritize counterterrorism, force protection, and infrastructure security over routine law enforcement.
The KP Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) reported that 137 police officers and personnel were killed in 2025, with attacks on police increasing 56% from 327 incidents in 2024 to 510 incidents in 2025.
Resource constraints, including low salaries and lack of equipment, affect the efficacy of police operations throughout the province.
In response to escalating drone threats from militants, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police announced the creation of Pakistan's first dedicated drone unit in December 2025, tasked with detecting and tracking militant drones, developing counter-drone technologies, and training personnel in anti-drone tactics.
Police Response
U.S. citizens should report crimes committed against them to the police and the U.S. Embassy’s American Citizen Services section at (+92) 51-201-4000/5000. Police response times are generally between 15-25 minutes, depending on the location and traffic conditions. In general, police response to criminal incidents is inconsistent in Pakistan, but especially so in Peshawar. Police and government forces are common targets of terrorist attacks. The local threat environment requires authorities to prioritize counterterrorism, force protection, and infrastructure security. Crimes often go unsolved or unprosecuted.
If police arrest or detain you, do not make any admissions or statements, or sign documents without consulting an attorney. Ask police or prison officials to notify the U.S. Embassy immediately. Typically, Pakistani law enforcement authorities will not notify the U.S. Embassy/Consulate if they arrest or detain a foreign citizen, unless you request that they do so. Arrested or detained U.S. citizens should request that Pakistani authorities immediately notify the U.S. Embassy or nearest Consulate. Pakistani government formalities may delay consular access by 20 business days or more. The Consulate can provide limited assistance with an arrestee’s immediate welfare and can provide local legal resource information and contacts.
Travelers with Special Considerations
For specific traveler concerns in Pakistan, review the local laws and circumstances on the Department of State’s Country Information Page.
Rule of Law, Arbitrary Detention, Official Harassment, Corruption, & Transparency
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Risk of Wrongful Detention “D” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Pakistan.
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but the government generally has not implemented the law effectively, and officials have frequently engaged in corrupt practices at all levels.
Cybersecurity
The Government of Pakistan has moderately sophisticated cyber capabilities. Pakistani cyber malefactors primarily conduct cyber operations against Indian defense and military entities. Pakistani cyber threat actors primarily rely on spear phishing, social engineering, and watering holes to distribute malicious software (malware), and are also known to target people connected to the previous Afghan government, military, and law enforcement in Kabul via social media. Pakistani malefactors have also developed malicious mobile apps and distributed them on fake app stores. Pakistan’s legal framework authorizes the intercept of all telecommunications data and requires Internet service providers to collect and retain all user data and share it with Pakistani authorities upon request. Pakistan has also reportedly acquired a national web monitoring system and directed the telecommunication industry to deploy a technical solution for monitoring “grey traffic,” such as VPNs.
Pakistan is most frequently the target of Indian cyber malefactors. Pakistani websites have been compromised and either defaced or used in watering hole operations on multiple occasions and have been the victim of hacktivists and other cyber criminals. Those who visit compromised sites may be tracked or targeted with malware or credential harvesting by malicious cyber actors. China has significant influence in Pakistan through the Belt and Road Initiative, foreign direct investment, and ownership of a significant portion of the country’s telecommunications services and infrastructure. China likely uses this influence and close relations with Pakistan to facilitate cyber espionage.
Those living in or traveling to Pakistan should take proactive steps to protect their devices, accounts, and information. Due to Pakistan’s telecommunications intercept capabilities, rely on VPNs and internal networks for sensitive communications. The VPN should be a paid service that is based in the U.S. or a trusted country. OSAC recommends using an encrypted messaging app for personal communications. Be wary of potential spear phishing messages, especially from spoofed or compromised accounts. Scrutinize social media connection requests. Maintain physical control of all devices, when possible, protect mobile devices with a strong passcode, and only download apps and software from trusted sources.
The security managers at the major and highest quality hotel chains in Pakistan are almost exclusively retired Pakistani military officers. This has implications with respect to the ability of the intelligence and security services to monitor movement and communication of private-sector personnel. While this does not necessarily mean that U.S. private-sector visitors will be targets for technical surveillance, it should be noted that it is very easy for the intelligence services to access major internet service providers; in fact, organizations may be compelled to cooperate with government operations if requested.
Import/Export Restrictions
Pakistan has banned the import of arms and ammunition, high explosives, radioactive substances, security printing, hazardous chemicals, currency, and alcoholic beverages. It is illegal to import alcohol into Pakistan without prior coordination with the government and even then, it is permissible only under very specific circumstances. Travelers entering Pakistan with alcohol face potentially severe penalties.
Satellite phones may be imported but require prior approval and registration to gain access to approved frequencies through the Frequency Allocation Board (FAB).
A country-specific listing of items/goods prohibited from being exported to the country or that are otherwise restricted is available from the U.S. International Trade Agency website.
Additional resources and reports can be found in the OSAC Traveler Toolkit.
