Published: August 6, 2025
This report is intended to supplement the U.S. Department of State Iraq Travel Advisory and Iraq Country Information Page.
Embassy & Consulate Contact Information
U.S. Embassy Baghdad: Al Kindi Street, Baghdad. Tel: +964-0760-030-3000; Regional Security Office Operations Center (24 hrs.): +964-0760-030-2833 (from Iraq local cell/landline) or 1-301-985-8841 ext. 2833/3343 (from the U.S.). Foreign Commercial Service Office: baghdad@trade.gov. Hours of Operation: 0800 – 1700, Sunday to Thursday.
U.S. Consulate General: 413 Ishtar, Ankawa, Erbil. Tel: +964-066-211-4554 (from Iraq) or 1-240-264-3467 extension 4554 (from the U.S.). Hours of Operation: 0800 – 1700, Sunday to Thursday.
OSAC Country Chapter(s)
The Country Chapter in Baghdad meets quarterly. The Country Chapter in Erbil meets in person quarterly with virtual connectivity for those out of country. Both Chapters maintain group chats for sharing routine and emergency information.
Contact OSAC’s Middle East & North Africa Team with any questions.
Iraq Travel Advisory
The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses that travelers should not travel due to terrorism, kidnapping, armed conflict, civil unrest and the U.S. government’s limited ability to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens in Iraq. Do not travel to Iraq for any reason.
Crime
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Baghdad as being a CRITICAL-threat location and Erbil as being a LOW-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Crime “C” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq.
Crime and lawlessness remain a serious threat throughout the country. In Baghdad, organized crime, uncontrolled militia activity, and corruption remain formidable obstacles to free enterprise and business. Most international corporations under contract with or employed in Iraq must adhere to strict safety and security procedures when traveling in and around Baghdad. Private security companies (PSCs) employing armored vehicles and protective security details (PSDs) remain a standard security practice for companies and diplomatic missions alike within Baghdad, including travel within the International Zone (IZ). These procedures mitigate the threat posed by small-arms fire and improve survivability in events involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs); they also reduce the potential for criminal targeting. There are considerable militia threats to all PSCs in Iraq; militias consider all PSCs to be “American.”
Some groups may capitalize on the disarray in the current Iraqi government to incite further chaos inside the country. Currently, there is minimal threat of IEDs targeting U.S. citizens or interests. Although while still present, IEDs are primarily used by tribal infighting or family quarrels. Additionally, Iranian-Aligned militia groups (IAMGs) use low-yield and crude sound bombs in Baghdad city to intimidate and extort small business owners in protection rackets.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
Crime statistics and/or crime reporting mechanisms in the IKR are unreliable relative to U.S. crime-data collection methods. However, recent analyses from 2024 provide a clearer picture of trends. According to the Strategic Center for Human Rights in Iraq, citing Interior Ministry data, Iraq, including the IKR, recorded a 15% reduction in overall crime rates in 2024 compared to 2023. Most crime in the IKR remains nonviolent, with Western expatriates generally not targeted, though they are advised to take basic precautions to avoid wrong-place/wrong-time incidents. Property thefts, particularly burglaries against offices and businesses, and snatch-and-grab robberies, especially at night in high-traffic areas, continue to be reported, but no known cases of burglary in high-end hotels were noted in recent reports. Perpetrators may target handbags or cell phones. Such crimes occur more often during hours of darkness and in high crime and popular tourist areas, such as downtown near the citadel.
Burglary against offices and businesses is more common than burglary from residences because offices and businesses are vacant at night. Most business owners must take basic precautions to prevent this type of crime, including installing window grilles, storing valuables in a safe and minimizing cash on-hand, practicing strong operational security, installing CCTV cameras, and in some cases, hiring private security. This includes businesses frequented by diplomats and expatriates. There are no known cases of burglary in high-end hotels. Prostitution is prevalent even in nicer establishments; guests inviting prostitutes into their room are much more likely to be targeted for robbery or other crimes.
Most homicides committed in the IKR were related to family or tribal disputes and did not involve foreigners. Homicides that do involve foreigners are more likely to be associated with terrorism. The most common type of violent crime in Erbil and the surrounding area is clashes between families or tribes involving firearms. Murder cases saw a significant 22% decrease, with 1,200 recorded in 2024 down from 1,540 in 2023, and serious assaults fell by 18%, with 3,500 incidents compared to 4,270 the previous year. Financial crimes also saw reductions, with bribery and embezzlement dropping by 25% and fraud by 20%.
The most common type of non-confrontational theft is “snatch-and-grab” robbery, in which perpetrators may target handbags or cell phones. Such crimes occur more often during hours of darkness and in high crime and popular tourist areas, such as downtown near the citadel. The increased number of refugees and internally displaced persons has likely increased this type of crime in the last several years. Expatriates do not seem to be specific targets, but those moving through the city without security details report taking security precautions that include group travel and avoiding high crime areas after dark.
Business scams are the most common type of fraud committed in Erbil, and these scams have targeted U.S. aid agencies and development partners. In most cases, criminals propose to carry out work, but after receiving payment, they disappear. Locals are also targets of business-related scams.
Kidnapping Threat
The U.S. Department of State has included a Kidnapping “K” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq, indicating that criminal or terrorist individuals or groups have threatened to and/or have seized or detained and threatened to kill, injure, or continue to detain individuals in order to compel a third party (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing something as a condition of release.
Kidnappings for political or monetary gain are common throughout Iraq. The threat ISIS and militia groups pose to conduct such operations remains high. Criminal organizations continue to use kidnapping as a method to fund operations, as well as a bargaining method to demand concessions from the government. In Baghdad, the kidnapping threat comes almost exclusively from militia groups, who may use it as a method to undermine U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic objectives in Iraq, or from criminal groups targeting individuals they perceive to be wealthy.
U.S. nationals are at high risk for kidnapping while in Iraq. Due to these concerns, the U.S. government requires personnel to live and work under strict security guidelines. All U.S. government employees under the authority of the Chief of Mission follow strict security procedures including the mandatory use of PSDs when traveling outside U.S. facilities. The Department of State advises U.S. organizations in Iraq to use PSDs to mitigate risk to their employees. Additional security information is available on the U.S. Embassy website.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
Most kidnappings in Erbil are related to family and tribal disputes. On the rare occasion when expatriates have been targets, the Kurdish police and security forces have been successful in resolving the cases. Recent reports do not mention specific kidnapping incidents involving Westerners in 2024 or 2025, suggesting a low incidence rate for expatriates. However, the risk persists, particularly from criminal organizations seeking ransom. When expatriates have been targeted, Kurdish police and security forces have been successful in resolving cases, as seen in a 2023 case involving an Indian national's family, where perpetrators were identified as restaurant employees. U.S. citizens are advised to maintain low profiles, avoid displaying wealth, and use protective security details (PSDs) to mitigate risks, especially given the high threat level noted in official advisories.
Terrorism
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Baghdad and Erbil as being CRITICAL-threat locations for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Terrorism “T” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq, indicating that terrorist attacks have occurred and/or specific threats against civilians, groups, or other targets may exist.
Terrorist and insurgent groups regularly attack Iraqi security forces and civilians. Anti-U.S. militias threaten U.S. citizens and international companies throughout Iraq. Attacks using improvised explosive devices, indirect fire, and unmanned aerial vehicles occur in many areas of the country, including Baghdad and other major cities. The Islamic State in Iraq, also known as ISIS, is a designated terrorist organization, which is active in northern and western Iraq. ISIS and its associated terrorist groups indiscriminately commit attacks and violent atrocities in Iraq despite improved Iraqi government control. ISIS, militia groups, and criminal gangs target U.S. citizens for attacks and hostage-taking. Iraq’s northern and western borders are especially dangerous due to the continued threat of attacks by terrorist groups, armed conflict, aerial bombardment, and civil unrest. U.S. citizens should especially avoid areas near armed groups in northern Iraq, which have been targeted with aerial strikes by neighboring countries’ militaries.
The following list is illustrative of the types of attacks and security events conducted during 2025 in Iraq:
- July 16: Several drone attacks targeted oil fields in northern Iraq.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
The IKR enjoys a strong relationship with the United States despite internal political divisions, Turkish military activity targeting of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) near the Iraq-Turkey border, political instability in Baghdad and areas of southern Iraq, and the ongoing ISIS threat. The IKR remains relatively secure.
Although ISIS no longer holds physical territory, the group has shown resilience. The remaining ISIS elements in the IKR are typically restricted to smuggling, financial operations, and planning. However, ISIS maintains lethal capabilities and presents a serious threat almost anywhere along the 700-mile-long Peshmerga and Iraqi Army defensive line. Throughout Ninewa, Diyala, and Kirkuk provinces, ISIS can conduct asymmetric attacks, to include the use of vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), ambushes, small unit infantry-style assaults, and assassinations. Terrorists often target Iraqi and coalition forces and Iraqi infrastructure, including highways and oil refineries.
ISIS remains on the defensive, but it is still highly capable and extremely dangerous. Recent reporting indicates that ISIS maintains sleeper cells in Mosul and along the Kurdish control line. ISIS remnants constitute a threat to Westerners operating in Diyala, Kirkuk, or traversing Mosul and traveling west toward Tal Afar and Sinjar.
Kurdish security forces conduct counter terrorism operations in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah regularly, but most operations occur outside of the Kurdish Coordination Line (KCL). Turkish operations against the PKK have increased since the beginning of spring 2024. Turkish operations included increased airstrikes and ground incursions, particularly in Dohuk and Erbil provinces, leading to civilian casualties and displacement, with Community Peacemaker Teams noting the advancement of Turkish forces 15 kilometers into Dohuk, affecting 162 villages. While the PKK announced a planned disarming and disbanding in February 2025, the situation remains tense, with ongoing military actions and potential for further escalation, impacting local stability and civilian life, as detailed in various human rights reports.
Following the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict, drones targeting U.S. bases in the IKR significantly increased. The Iraqi Resistance in Iraq (IRI) claimed responsibility for the attacks. Airborne threats against the bases and immediate vicinity remain one of the most significant risks to U.S. interests in the IKR.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) devotes considerable resources to protect its key government buildings, vital infrastructure, the diplomatic community, and soft targets such as hotels, churches, mosques, and shopping areas.
Individuals required to live or travel in Iraq should use an in-country security advisor or some type of PSD support to limit potential terrorist and criminal threats. Travelers to the IKR should consider using all available security assets to minimize any potential terrorist or criminal risks to include protective security or a local driver who knows routes, speaks the local language, and knows which areas may present a higher degree of risk.
Political Violence and Civil Unrest
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Baghdad and Erbil as being CRITICAL-threat locations for political violence directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Civil Unrest “U” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq, indicating that demonstrations, protests, and/or strikes occur frequently, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond adequately. Civil unrest can develop quickly without prior notice, often interrupting logistics and services. Avoid demonstration activity, as even those planned to remain peaceful have the potential to turn violent.
Elections/Political Stability
After over a yearlong stalemate, Iraq’s parliament selected a prime minister and formed its first cabinet since 2005 without any Sadr-aligned members. The 2021 elections resulted in a plurality for Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his allies, but he was unable to form a coalition government while excluding Iranian-aligned parties. The Sadr bloc ultimately resigned in protest, ceding parliamentary control to Iran-backed factions. This triggered massive street protests, a temporary occupation of parliament, and clashes that left at least 30 dead and dozens injured. Rocket attacks targeted the Green Zone during the government formation process, but Mohammed Shia al-Sudani eventually assumed office in late 2022, and violent unrest diminished.
Iraq held its first provincial council elections in over a decade in December 2023, covering 15 of 18 provinces. By early 2024, newly elected councils began appointing governors, largely reflecting the dominance of Iran-aligned parties and sidelining Sadrists. While large-scale protests have not returned, political tensions remain high, particularly in southern Iraq, where disillusionment with entrenched elites continues to fester. The Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC) has scheduled parliamentary elections for November 2025.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
The Kurdistan Region's political landscape saw significant activity with the parliamentary elections held on October 20, 2024, after delays since 2022. These elections, marked by economic crises and political rifts, resulted in neither the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) nor the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) securing a majority, leading to concerns about political division. The inconclusive results, with ongoing negotiations to form a government, could exacerbate tensions, potentially fragmenting regional power. The U.S. government, emphasizing the importance of resolving these issues, has supported efforts to reduce tensions, as seen in diplomatic engagements reported by the Washington Kurdish Institute. The political situation remains fluid, with the evidence suggesting a challenging period ahead for government formation and stability. The Kurds are an important U.S. partner and are public in their desire for a continued U.S. diplomatic and military presence in Iraq. Traditionally, the IKR has been one of the most prosperous and stable regions in Iraq. However, deteriorating relations between the IKR’s two largest political parties – the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – have hindered Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) operations and threatened the KRG’s ability to deliver on the region’s interests in Baghdad. The United States is of the firm belief that a lack of cooperation among the IKR’s political parties not only hurt the strength of the IKR’s position within a united and federal Iraq but also harm overall security and stability in Iraq. The U.S. government has supported efforts to reduce tensions between the parties to strengthen their effectiveness both in the IKR and in Baghdad. The KDP and the PUK recently initiated a process to address political, economic, and security disputes between the two parties. While that process is currently paused, the United States is encouraging both sides to resume dialogue and establish a united front in its dealings with Baghdad on critical issues including the budget, hydrocarbons management, and security.
Protests & Demonstrations
Protests are common in Baghdad and other major cities, often occurring without warning, while larger demonstrations are typically signaled in advance through social media. In southern Iraq, including Basra and Nasiriyah, localized unrest continues over water shortages, electricity supply, and poor public services. Demonstrations over electricity supply also occur in Baghdad during the hot summer months. In June 2025, protests also broke out in Baghdad and Najaf in response to the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict, drawing several hundred participants and prompting a heightened security presence near foreign diplomatic sites.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
Protests in the IKR continue to focus on domestic issues, with recent activity in 2025 highlighting economic grievances. Protests in Erbil over power cuts on July 13, 2025, resulted in one civilian death during clashes with security forces, who intervened to open blocked highways. Historical data shows similar patterns, with significant protests in December 2020 over unpaid salaries in Sulaymaniyah, leading to several deaths and arrests. These demonstrations, often peaceful, can turn violent, with security forces using tear gas and making arrests, as seen in a February 2025 protest by the Committee to Protect Journalists, where journalists were teargassed and detained. Travelers are advised to avoid protest areas, especially given the potential for rapid escalation, as evidenced by recent reports.
Anti-U.S./Anti-Western Sentiment
The threat of kidnapping, rocket and mortar attacks, use of IEDs, and small-arms fire against official and private U.S. interests remains high. Iran-aligned militia groups (IAMGs) such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), KH, and the nationalistic Peace Brigades Militia have previously targeted U.S. interests. There are multiple reports of attempted targeting of U.S. nationals, and Westerners at large for kidnapping. There are also new reports of militia groups kidnapping locals, foreign workers, and members of international organizations, and demanding ransoms from either their families or their employers.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
Erbil and the broader Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) remain comparatively stable, with a generally favorable view toward U.S. citizens and other Westerners, despite occasional protests and online criticism of U.S. foreign policy. Security incidents occur far less frequently in the IKR than in provinces like Anbar, Baghdad, Salah al-Din, and Ninewa. However, the threat of attacks in IKR remains a concern. The heavy presence of the Peshmerga on Kurdish defensive lines has been a stabilizing force, especially when working in tandem with Coalition air power and U.S. advise/assist efforts. This combination has undoubtedly prevented significant acts of terrorism in Erbil and other major urbans areas in the IKR.
Law Enforcement
The emergency line in Iraq is 130. Visitors and expatriates should always carry proper identification to avoid harassment and delays at checkpoints. Cooperate with instructions if Iraqi security personnel approach you.
The emergency line for police in IKR is: 104
Numerous domestic security forces operate throughout the country. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are organized administratively within the Ministries of Interior and Defense, as well as within the quasi-ministerial Counterterrorism Service. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for domestic law enforcement and maintenance of order; it oversees the Federal Police, Provincial Police, Facilities Protection Service, Civil Defense, and Department of Border Enforcement. Energy police, under the Ministry of Oil, are responsible for protecting energy infrastructure. Conventional military forces under the Ministry of Defense also carry out counterterrorism and internal security operations in conjunction with the Ministry of Interior. The Counterterrorism Service reports directly to the prime minister and oversees the Counterterrorism Command, an organization that includes three brigades of special operations forces. The National Security Service intelligence agency reports directly to the prime minister. The security of the International Zone in Baghdad is controlled by the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), and Special Division (SD) of the Iraq Security Force.
The country’s regular armed forces and domestic law enforcement bodies struggled to maintain order within the country, operating in parallel with the Popular Mobilization Committee, a state-sponsored umbrella military organization composed of approximately 60 militia groups, also known as Popular Mobilization Forces. Although the Popular Mobilization Forces are part of the Iraqi Security forces and receive funding from the government’s defense budget, their operations are often outside government control and in opposition to government policies. Most popular mobilization unit members are Shia Arabs, reflecting the demographics of the country, while Sunni Arab, Yezidi, Christian, and other minority groups tended to organize their own units, generally operating within or near their home regions. All popular mobilization units officially report to the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Committee and are under the ultimate authority of the prime minister, but several units were in practice also responsive to Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The two main Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, each maintain an independent security apparatus. Under the federal constitution, the Kurdistan Regional Government has the right to maintain internal security forces, but the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party separately control additional Peshmerga military units, as well as separate police forces under nominal Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Interior control. The constitution also allows for a centralized, separate Asayish internal security service; however, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also maintain Asayish forces. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also maintain separate intelligence services, nominally organized under the Kurdistan Region Security Council.
Federal civilian authorities did not maintain effective control over some elements of the security forces, particularly certain Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Force units and the Popular Mobilization Committee. Poorly defined administrative boundaries and disputed territories between the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the central government led to confusion over the jurisdiction of security forces and the courts. Members of the security forces committed numerous documented abuses.
Police Response
Iraqi police do not meet U.S. or Western standards. ISF maintains a large presence in most major urban areas to limit potential terrorist, insurgent, and militia activity, though they have a limited ability to respond to security incidents, terrorist attacks, and criminal activities. Response times and capabilities may vary wildly. There are many permanent, manned checkpoints in and around major cities. Temporary checkpoints often appear without advance notice.
Erbil and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR):
Kurdish police and security services are out in adequate numbers. Visitors can move around urban areas in relative safety. When a Western expatriate has been the victim of a crime, Kurdish police take the case seriously and typically identify and arrest the perpetrators. KRG police and military units can respond quickly to security incidents, terrorist attacks, and criminal activities. KRG police and security services have sufficient training and command and control to direct their officers where required and have modern weapons and security equipment. Specialized units, such as tactical response and explosive ordinance disposal teams, have enhanced training and equipment. KRG police and security services are professional and highly responsive to diplomats, U.S. citizens, and other Westerners.
Travelers with Special Considerations
For specific traveler concerns in Iraq, review the local laws and circumstances on the Department of State’s Country Information Page.
Rule of Law, Arbitrary Detention, Official Harassment, Corruption, & Transparency
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Risk of Wrongful Detention “D” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Iraq.
The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government does not implement the laws effectively. The law allows some individuals convicted of corruption to receive amnesty upon repaying money obtained through corruption, effectively allowing them to keep any profits derived from the stolen funds.
Corruption remains a chief obstacle to effective governance at all institutional levels, including in the IKR. Bribery, money laundering, nepotism, and misappropriation of public funds are common at all levels and across all branches of government. Family, tribal, and ethno-sectarian considerations significantly influence government decisions at all levels and across all branches of government. Federal and KRG officials frequently engage in corrupt practices with impunity.
Anticorruption efforts were hampered by a lack of agreement concerning institutional roles, political will, political influence, lack of transparency, and unclear governing legislation and regulatory processes. The existence of armed militias, which were directly involved in corruption and provided protection for corrupt officials, made serious and sustainable anticorruption efforts difficult to enforce.
Cybersecurity
There are no cybersecurity concerns specific to private-sector organizations operating in Iraq.
Import/Export Restrictions
Customs officers have the broad authority to search persons or vehicles at Iraqi ports of entry. Officers may confiscate any goods they deem may pose a threat to the peace, security, health, environment, or social order of Iraq. Authorities may confiscate antiquities or cultural items suspected of illegal export, as well as undeclared goods. Visitors may also have to return such goods, at their expense, to the jurisdiction from which they came. Satellite phones are permitted in Iraq (and IKR).
A country-specific listing of items/goods prohibited from being exported to the country or that are otherwise restricted is available from the U.S. International Trade Agency website.
Additional resources and reports can be found in the OSAC Traveler Toolkit.
