Published: March 10, 2025
This report is intended to supplement the U.S. Department of State Georgia Travel Advisory and Georgia Country Information Page.
Embassy & Consulate Contact Information
U.S. Embassy Tbilisi
29 Georgian American Friendship Avenue, Didi Dighomi, Tbilisi 0131
Tel: +995 (32) 227-70-00.
Emergency After-Hours Telephone: +(995) (32) 227-7000
Hours: 0900 – 1800, Monday – Friday
OSAC Country Chapter
The Country Chapter in Tbilisi is active, meeting quarterly.
Contact OSAC’s Europe team with any questions.
Georgia Travel Advisory
The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses that travelers should exercise normal precautions in Georgia. Some areas have increased risk.
The Department of State recommends travelers do not travel to the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The United States and most other countries consider these regions part of Georgia. However, de facto local authorities claim independence, and Russian troops and border guards occupy both regions. Attacks, criminal incidents, and kidnappings have occurred in and around the areas. While none of the activity has been anti-American in nature, there is a high risk of travelers finding themselves in a wrong place/wrong time situation.
The Department of State also recommends travelers do not travel to the Georgian region of Pankisi Gorge. The Department of State cautions U.S. citizens against travel to the Pankisi Gorge region (north of the villages of Matane and Chorale, to the border with Russia, including the city of Duisk) because of the current security environment and the potential for civil unrest. There are restrictions on U.S. Embassy personnel traveling to this region or within five kilometers of it. While the Georgian government has had success in combating terrorism within its borders, U.S. citizens should remain vigilant. ISIS recruiting has occurred in Pankisi in the past, and some known terrorists have confirmed ties to the Pankisi Gorge region.
The U.S. Embassy does not have any off-limits areas for its personnel within Tbilisi but advises members of the U.S. government community to exercise caution in tourist areas particularly in the downtown area, as these locations are where tourists report frequent crimes of opportunity.
Crime
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Tbilisi as being a MEDIUM-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
Crime in Georgia’s capital city, Tbilisi – where over 30% of the country’s population resides – is comparable to that of a large U.S. city. Georgian police maintain a visible presence throughout the city and other major urban areas. The Georgian Internal Affairs Ministry crime statistics for 2023 showed a 0.47% overall decrease of crime nationwide. Premeditated murder and attempted murders decreased by 8.7% and organized theft decreased 3.96% compared to 2022, while reports of armed robberies increased by 10.38%.
U.S. travelers and other Westerners have been victims of crime in Georgia. Take the same precautions as you would in any large city. Alcohol consumption is prevalent and has been attributed to escalating or exacerbating otherwise minor disputes. Firearms are readily available in Georgia; assailants may be armed, and disputes with firearms could occur. Carrying pocketknives or other cutting devices is illegal under most circumstances. You may be detained or cited if found in violation.
Maintain a low profile, do not carry large amounts of cash, and do not draw unnecessary attention to yourself. Foreign visitors report having items stolen from locked hotel rooms. Refuse invitations from strangers to come into bars or nightclubs. These ploys lure individuals into bars, where hustlers extort travelers for large amounts of cash, threatening physical harm if the travelers refuse to pay for exorbitantly priced drinks. There are reports of criminals using dating apps to lure unsuspecting individuals to locations that coordinate with the “date” to take advantage of the victim by extorting money. These scams are common, and the Embassy advises caution.
Incidents continue to occur involving young street children known to operate in small groups, which physically hold/restrain their victim’s arms and legs while another goes through their pockets and bags. Organized crime remains an issue; high-profile arrests of Georgian nationals involved with transnational criminal groups continue to occur throughout Europe. Street gangs and drug dealers are common in Tbilisi and other urban areas of Georgia. These groups do not specifically target foreigners.
Georgian authorities have seized illegal weapons caches to include handguns, rifles, and hand grenades. Georgia is a post-conflict nation with weapons remaining in the country relating to the fall of the Soviet Union, as well as two internal conflicts (involving the Russian-occupied Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia). There is no indication of a correlation between the seized caches and crime.
Financial crimes in the form of credit card fraud against individuals and larger targeted attacks against banks and other financial institutions are not uncommon. Georgian law enforcement agencies continue to put substantial resources into combatting financial crimes and continue to make arrests in this area. Credit card skimming is not common but is known to occur.
Kidnapping Threat
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Kidnapping “K” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Geogia.
The threat to U.S. nationals of kidnapping exists, particularly in the Russian-occupied Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Terrorism
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Tbilisi as being a MEDIUM-threat location for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Terrorism “T” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Georgia.
Terrorist groups and those inspired by such organizations are intent on attacking U.S. citizens abroad. Terrorists are increasingly using less sophisticated methods of attack – including knives, firearms, and vehicles – to more effectively target crowds. Terrorists may attack with little or no warning. They may target high-profile public events (sporting contests, political rallies, demonstrations, holiday events, celebratory gatherings, etc.); hotels, clubs, and restaurants frequented by tourists; places of worship; schools; parks; tourism infrastructure; shopping malls and markets; and public transportation systems (including subways, buses, trains, and scheduled commercial flights).
The terrorism situation in Georgia remains quiet and stable. While terrorism incidents are uncommon within Georgia, arrests occur annually. In 2023, authorities arrested nine Georgian citizens and three foreign nationals for their affiliation with ISIS with two subjects also arrested in 2024.
Georgia’s proximity to Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Russian North Caucasus region (all of which have experienced some measure of recent terrorist-related activity) continues to be of concern. Its geographic location makes it a natural transit area for individuals from these regions. Foreign fighters from Georgia, or who transited Georgia, have joined ISIS and other terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq. Terrorist recruiting has occurred in Pankisi in the past, and some known terrorists have confirmed ties to the Pankisi Gorge region.
Georgia is generally capable of detecting, deterring, and responding to terrorism incidents. The State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) has the mandate to handle terrorism-related incidents and investigations and works closely through its Counterterrorism Center with the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Justice, and Defense and the Prosecution Service of Georgia, among others, as well as with international partners. SSSG is generally well equipped and well trained, and its Counterterrorism Unit continues to receive regular training and equipment from international partners and conducts internal training. Georgia has also bolstered its land border and maritime security by developing new systems and participating in international exercises and U.S.-conducted trainings.
Political Violence and Civil Unrest
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Tbilisi as being a HIGH-threat location for political violence directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Civil Unrest “U” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Georgia indicating that demonstrations, protests, and/or strikes occur frequently, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond adequately. Civil unrest can develop quickly without prior notice, often interrupting logistics and services. Avoid demonstration activity, as even those planned to remain peaceful have the potential to turn violent.
Elections/Political Stability
There is no known threat of political violence directed specifically against U.S. nationals. Historically political violence incidents increase around Georgian elections. Violent actions include attacks on political party headquarters, members, and intimidation or physical assaults outside voting locations.
Protests & Demonstrations
Large political rallies and demonstrations leading up to or following elections often occur in downtown Tbilisi and other major city centers throughout Georgia. They may occur with little or no notice. Triggers often include sudden controversial governmental policy changes or legal announcements, high-profile political arrests, or due to recent or upcoming elections. Most gatherings are organized by groups that are not affiliated with a party (e.g., Shame Movement) or opposition parties, but opposition parties often help advertise and participate in them. Groups typically organize these gatherings in advance via social media (e.g., Facebook), but at times are uncoordinated.
Protests often occur outside Parliament, along Rustavelli Ave. which runs parallel to its east, and can extend to Republic Square to the north of Rustavelli Ave. and Freedom Square to its south. Previous events included gatherings at major metro stations throughout the downtown area followed by marches to these three locations, Heroes Square, and/or Europe Square. Chavchavadze Ave., which connects to Republic Square’s west, is a common transit point for protesters especially if comprised of students. Protests also typically start around 1900 hrs. and often disperse by midnight.
Demonstrations in Tbilisi have the potential to draw large crowds in a short amount of time, which significantly affects traffic and pedestrian movement. They can therefore cause substantial logistical difficulties for businesses in the area, including hotels along Rustaveli Avenue near Parliament. To date, there have not been any protest-related acts of major violence reported against U.S. nationals in Tbilisi.
The Georgian government’s decision to suspend its efforts to join the EU at the end of November 2024 sparked large protests which continue as of March 2025. Violence occurred during the first six days of these protests but have since largely remained peaceful. Violence included use of fireworks and Molotov cocktails against law enforcement and Parliament, in addition to law enforcement actions to include usage of water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, and physical force. U.S. citizens have been detained, arrested, and/or suffered injuries as a result of participation or being present during protests. During the earlier violent days, there were reports commercial establishments being looted or damaged. This often occurred at businesses near locations where protesters and law enforcement clashed.
U.S. Embassy Tbilisi continues to warn its personnel and all U.S. nationals to avoid areas of demonstrations and to exercise caution near large public gatherings when possible, as even demonstrations intended to be peaceful can turn confrontational and escalate into violence.
Anti-U.S./Anti-Western Sentiment
The country faces two separate and distinct streams of anti-U.S. sentiment: U.S.-Russian relations, and anti-U.S. rhetoric. There have been no direct cases of violence solely attributed to anti-U.S./anti-Western sentiment.
In May 2024, the Georgian government signed a “foreign agents” bill into law, which requires organizations that receive more than 20% of their funding from overseas to register as “agents of foreign influence.” Foreign agent laws are often modelled off similar Russian law and disproportionately target civil society and media organizations. In February 2025, the Georgian government announced a new “foreign agents” bill titled the “Foreign Agents Registration Act.”
A sizeable minority of the population prefers political alignment with Russia. Georgia also continues to deal with the geopolitical effects of the 2008 war with the Russian Federation.
The Alliance of Patriots political party staged two anti-U.S. government peaceful demonstrations outside the U.S. Embassy in late 2019 and early 2020 that did not impact the U.S. private-sector community. Small anti-western protests also occurred in 2024 and 2025 amidst the background of pro-EU protests in the downtown area.
Law Enforcement
Although there has been much progress in the government's efforts to reform the police organizations and improve overall professionalism, work to effectively deter criminal activity, and conduct effective post-incident investigations remains.
The most visible police presence is that of the Patrol Police, who patrol in marked vehicles throughout the country; they increase their visibility by patrolling with their emergency lights on. The Protection Police (also known as Security Police) are a visible presence throughout the larger cities of Georgia near government buildings and crowded tourist areas. The Special Tasks Department (STD) is the riot control and border security arm of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and most often noted during protests and along the administrative boundary lines.
The Criminal Police conduct investigations but may also provide first responder support akin to the Patrol Police in less populated regions of Georgia. In addition, areas along the Tbilisi-administered territory along the ABLs are patrolled by the Internal Affairs Ministry’s Special Task Division (STD). STD is also the agency primarily responsible for crowd control during demonstrations.
Police Response
Emergency services will respond to the best of their ability, but terrain, road, and weather conditions, as well as limited resources, could severely affect response times. In general, police are attentive and responsive to requests/calls for assistance from foreigners and U.S. nationals. However, their effectiveness is contingent on resources, or lack thereof, and the level of training among officers varies. Police response in Tbilisi can range from several minutes to more than one hour. Police response outside of Tbilisi can be considerably longer.
All emergency services can be reached by dialing 112 to connect with an Emergency Management Services (EMS) call center from any phone in Georgia. EMS will direct the emergency to the police, fire, and/or ambulance services depending on the emergency. Of note, calling 911 will redirect the caller to the 112 call center. A fluent English operator is available 24/7.
Travelers with Special Considerations
For specific traveler concerns in Georgia, review the local laws and circumstances on the Department of State’s Country Information Page.
Rule of Law, Arbitrary Detention, Official Harassment, Corruption, & Transparency
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Risk of Wrongful Detention “D” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Georgia.
If arrested, you may be held in pre-trial detention for up to nine months. If you are arrested or detained, ask police or prison officials to notify the U.S. Embassy immediately. Notification to U.S. Embassy Tbilisi of the arrest of U.S. citizens is typically significantly delayed in Georgia. In addition, the Georgian police have the authority under the Administration Violation Code to detain individuals for up to 24 hours without court intervention and 48 hours with court approval (this is referred to as “administrative detention”). There are no due process rights assigned during an administrative hold, meaning the person has no right to counsel.
The constitution provides for an independent and impartial judiciary in civil matters, but there are concerns regarding the process of assigning civil judges to narrow specializations, based on their loyalty to certain influential judges or others, and transparency of rulings. The constitution and law stipulate that a person who suffers damages resulting from arbitrary detention or other unlawful or arbitrary acts, including human rights violations, is entitled to submit a civil action. Individuals have the right to appeal court decisions involving alleged violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by the state to the ECHR after they have exhausted domestic avenues of appeal.
There have been reports of lack of due process and respect for rule of law in several property-rights cases. NGOs also reported several cases in which groups claimed the government improperly used tax liens to pressure organizations.
The law provides criminal penalties for officials convicted of corruption. While the government implements the law effectively against low-level corruption, NGOs continue to cite weak checks and balances and a lack of independence of law enforcement agencies among the factors contributing to allegations of high-level corruption. NGOs assess there are no effective mechanisms for preventing corruption in state-owned enterprises and independent regulatory bodies.
There are frequent reports of detentions of Georgians along the ABLs of both the Russian-occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Cybersecurity
According to official crime statistics, there was a 7.3% increase in cybercrime from 2022 to 2023. Georgia remains a location for cryptocurrency mining, and criminal actors continue to exploit the current environment in country to perpetrate cybercrime.
In October 2019, the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST, also known as Unit 74455 and Sandworm) carried out a widespread disruptive cyber-attack against Georgia. The incident, which directly affected the Georgian population, disrupted operations of several thousand Georgian government and privately-run websites and interrupted the broadcast of at least two major television stations.
Avoid using publicly available internet terminals and Wi-Fi, as they may be compromised. Use a Virtual Private Network (VPN) when traveling overseas.
Import/Export Restrictions
Georgia has no quantitative restrictions (quotas) on trade, except on ozone-depleting substances. Medical products, firearms, explosives, radioactive substances, dual use goods, industrial waste, and a few types of agricultural chemical products are subject to import/export licensing. Georgia has strict regulations on the import or export of alcohol, tobacco, jewelry, religious materials, art or artifacts, antiquities, and business equipment. You must obtain a license to export items of historical value, such as artwork, antiques, jewelry, or paintings.
Per Georgian law, it is illegal to undertake any type of economic activity in Abkhazia or South Ossetia if such activities require permits, licenses, or registration. Georgian laws also ban mineral exploration, money transfers, the sale of real property (land and houses), and international transit via Abkhazia or South Ossetia.
There are no known restrictions on the import and use of satellite phones in Georgia.
A country-specific listing of items/goods prohibited from being exported to the country or that are otherwise restricted is available from the U.S. International Trade Agency website.
Additional resources and reports can be found in the OSAC Traveler Toolkit.
