Published: April 3, 2025
This report is intended to supplement the U.S. Department of State Libya Travel Advisory and Libya Country Information Page.
Embassy & Consulate Contact Information
There is currently no physical U.S. Embassy in Libya. Address questions to the Libya External Office in Tunis or the Consular Section of the U.S. Embassy in Tunis: Northeast Zone, Les Berges du Lac, 1053 Tunis, Tunisia. Telephone: +216-71-107-000, press 0 and ask for the Libya Office consular officer.
Emergency After-Hours Telephone: +216-58-575-409
Hours: Winter: 0800 to 1645; Summer: 0730 to 1600; Ramadan: 0800 to 1500.
OSAC Country Chapter(s)
Tripoli does not have an active OSAC Country Chapter. Contact OSAC’s Middle East & North Africa team with any questions.
Libya Travel Advisory
The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses that travelers should not travel to Libya due to crime, terrorism, unexploded landmines, civil unrest, kidnapping, and armed conflict.
Crime
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Tripoli as being a CRITICAL-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Crime “C” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Libya, indicating that there may be widespread violent crime and/or organized crime present in the country, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond to serious crimes.
Crimes of opportunity, such as theft, burglary, and purse-snatching occur frequently against foreigners. Criminal groups have perpetrated killings of civilians without consequence.
Armed groups aligned with the interim Government of National Unity (GNU) as well as those aligned with the Libyan National Army (LNA) have committed extra-judicial killings of politicians and civilians without consequence. Many Libyans have been forcibly disappeared. Journalists and other activists have been the targets of attack, exemplifying the collapse of political expression, press, and free speech.
Expect extensive corruption and indiscriminate violence against civilians. Libya’s judicial system is extremely corrupt. There have been thousands of cases of arbitrary arrests without due process. Armed groups often exercise law enforcement duties as they see fit. Torture is common in internment facilities throughout the country. Prisons are overcrowded and do not provide adequate healthcare services. There have been allegations of unlawful killings, sexual violence, and forced labor in Libyan prisons.
Kidnapping Threat
The U.S. Department of State has included a Kidnapping “K” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Libya, indicating that criminal or terrorist individuals or groups have threatened to and/or have seized or detained and threatened to kill, injure, or continue to detain individuals in order to compel a third party (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing something as a condition of release.
Kidnapping remains a significant issue in Libya associated with criminal, militia, and terrorist organizations.
Terrorism
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Tripoli as being a MEDIUM-threat location for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Terrorism “T” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Libya, indicating that terrorist attacks have occurred and/or specific threats against civilians, groups, or other targets may exist.
Terrorism directed against U.S. government and western affiliated organizations is possible. Worldwide, extremist groups often target tourist sites, hotels, restaurants, shopping malls, businesses, transportation hubs, foreign embassies, expatriate residential areas, and schools. There have been terrorist attacks and kidnappings of foreigners across the region. ISIS, Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi (AAS-B), and Ansar al-Sharia in Dernah (AAS-D) are active in the region and pose a threat to U.S. and other travelers. Terrorist organizations have perpetrated killings of politicians and civilians without consequence.
AQIM aims to overthrow various African regimes and replace them with one ruled by sharia law, establishing an Islamic caliphate across all of North and West Africa. Headquartered in Algeria, AQIM also operates in Tunisia and Libya.
AAS-B and AAS-D officially disbanded in 2017, but fighters and local elements remain. GNU and LNA forces routinely carry out operations against religious extremist groups, particularly in southern Libya.
ISIS-Libya aims to prevent the formation of a reunified Libyan state, secure control over the country's critical resources, and, ultimately, establish an Islamic caliphate in Libya. It has been active in Libya since approximately 2015, with its original headquarters in Sirte. ISIS-Libya no longer controls territory in Libya but does maintain a low-profile presence throughout much of the country.
Political Violence and Civil Unrest
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Tripoli as being a HIGH-threat location for political violence directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Civil Unrest “U” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Libya, indicating that demonstrations, protests, and/or strikes occur frequently, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond adequately. Civil unrest can develop quickly without prior notice, often interrupting logistics and services. Avoid demonstration activity, as even those planned to remain peaceful have the potential to turn violent.
Elections/Political Stability
The Tripoli-based GNU and the Benghazi-based LNA largely upheld the 2020 ceasefire agreement, although both sides continued receiving support from foreign military forces, foreign fighters, and mercenaries. Informal non-state armed groups continue to fill security vacuums across the country. ISIS-Libya attempted to maintain a limited presence in the southwestern desert. After the formation of the interim GNU, elections were scheduled to be held on December 24, 2021, but were postponed due to disputes over the candidate list. The country remains divided along regional and political lines, and a new election date has not been announced.
Clashes between rival military factions occur, but less frequent than in recent years. For example, in March 2024, the Libya-Tunisia border crossing at Ras Jedir was closed following clashes between armed groups and Libyan security forces.
Protests & Demonstrations
The law on guidelines for peaceful demonstrations fails to include relevant security assurances for protesters and severely restricts the exercise of the right of assembly. The law mandates protesters must inform the government of any planned protest at least 48 hours in advance and provides that the government may notify the organizers that it has banned the protest as little as 12 hours before the event.
In September, protests calling for the removal of authorities took place in Derna after two insufficiently maintained dams broke during heavy rains, causing significant flooding and resulting in thousands of deaths. There were also protests over Libya’s foreign minister meeting with Israel’s foreign minister. Additionally, there have been strikes/protests over control of oil production.
Anti-U.S./Anti-Western Sentiment
Anti-U.S. sentiment is common in Libya given shared history and prior authoritarian regimes.
Law Enforcement
The emergency line in Libya is 1515.
The Government of National Unity maintained limited control over security forces, which consisted of a mix of semiregular and nominally integrated units, tribal armed groups, and civilian volunteers. The national police force under the Ministry of Interior oversaw internal security, supported by the armed forces under the Ministry of Defense. Civilian authorities had only nominal control of the police and the security apparatus; security-related police work generally fell to armed groups, which, while officially falling under security institutions, remained at least partially independent of state authority. Most of these nominally integrated armed groups supplemented their government funding with proceeds from licit and illicit activities and varied significantly in terms of training, supervision, and/or accountability.
There were reports that members of security forces aligned with both the Government of National Unity and the Libyan National Army, including contracted elements of Russia’s Wagner Group supporting the Libyan National Army, committed numerous abuses. The Government of National Unity and the Libyan National Army, along with other nonstate actors, largely upheld a 2020 cease-fire agreement, although both sides continued receiving support from foreign governments, military forces, fighters, and mercenaries. Officially constituted and nominally integrated armed groups filled security vacuums across the country. ISIS-Libya was active in the southwestern desert.
Police Response
The Tripoli-based GNU has various ground and coast guard forces under its command consisting of regular and semi-regular military units and tribal armed groups and has a limited number of regular air and naval forces; the Turkish military and Syrian mercenaries advise and augment these forces. The eastern-based LNA under Khalifa Haftar is a mix of regular and semi-regular military units and tribal armed groups; Russian Wagner Group, Syrian, Chadian, Sudanese, and Nigerien mercenaries augment these forces.
Travelers with Special Considerations
For specific traveler concerns in Libya, review the local laws and circumstances on the Department of State’s Country Information Page.
Rule of Law, Arbitrary Detention, Official Harassment, Corruption, & Transparency
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Risk of Wrongful Detention “D” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Libya.
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption. The government did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption. The government lacked significant mechanisms to investigate corruption, including incidents allegedly involving members of police and security forces, but some investigations and prosecutions occurred, according to local media reports.
Divisions in economic and oversight institutions between the east and the west, including the Central Bank of Libya and the Audit Bureau, limited transparency and capacity for institutional oversight. Efforts continued to reunify institutions, including through United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)-mediated negotiations.
Internal conflict and the weakness of public institutions undermined implementation of the law. According to reports by the Audit Bureau, the highest financial regulatory authority in the country, officials frequently engaged with impunity in corrupt practices such as graft, bribery, and nepotism. There were also numerous reports of government corruption, including involvement in money laundering, human smuggling, and other criminal activities.
Slow progress in implementing decentralization legislation, particularly regarding management of revenues from oil and gas exports and distribution of government funds, led to accusations of corruption and calls for greater transparency.
The Audit Bureau made efforts to improve transparency by publishing annual reports on government revenues and expenditures, national projects, and administrative corruption but did not have oversight of eastern Libya-based institutions due to the government’s limited ability to exert control in the east.
Cybersecurity
The internet in Libya is heavily monitored by the government, militias, and Libyan intelligence services.
Import/Export Restrictions
Counterfeit and stolen goods are often for sale, but the purchase of such items is illegal in the United States and is sometimes illegal under local Libyan law. Expect customs to be strict when exporting or importing prohibited goods. These items include firearms, religious materials, antiquities, medications, currency, alcohol, pornography, and pork products. Exchanging currency outside of authorized agencies is illegal and penalties are severe.
The use and import of satellite phones are permitted but require registration with the authorities in Libya.
A country-specific listing of items/goods prohibited from being exported to the country or that are otherwise restricted is available from the U.S. International Trade Agency website.
Additional resources and reports can be found in the OSAC Traveler Toolkit.
