Published: December 2, 2024
This report is intended to supplement the U.S. Department of State Burma Travel Advisory and Burma Country Information Page.
Embassy & Consulate Contact Information
U.S. Embassy Rangoon
110 University Avenue, Kamayut Township, Rangoon
Tel: +(95) 1-753-6-509
After-hours Emergency: +(95) 1-753-6-509. Hours: Monday-Friday, 0800-1630.
OSAC Country Chapters
The OSAC Burma Country Chapter meets regularly, though not all members are able to attend in-person. The Country Chapter maintains an active Signal chat group. Additionally, the Regional Security Office (RSO) provides country briefings for representatives of U.S. businesses, non-governmental organizations, academia, and faith-based organizations as requested. For more information on the Country Chapter, or to connect with the RSO, contact OSAC’s Asia team.
Burma Travel Advisory
The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses that travelers should not travel to Burma (also known as Myanmar) due to civil unrest, armed conflict, and arbitrary enforcement of local laws; reconsider travel due to limited and/or inadequate healthcare resources; and exercise increased caution due to wrongful detentions and areas with land mines and unexploded ordnance.
Crime
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Yangon as being a LOW-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Crime “C” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Burma.
The emergency telephone lines are 191 for the fire department, 192 for ambulance service, and 199 for police, but those emergency lines are operable only in the major cities of Yangon, Nay Pyi Taw, and Mandalay.
Crime rates, especially those involving foreigners, are lower in Burma than many other countries in the region. While violent crime against foreigners is rare, the overall crime rate has climbed in Yangon in 2024 with increases in theft and burglary. People should take particular care when taking taxis at night and be cognizant of the 1:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m. curfew.
Due to the economic strain brought about by the February 2021 military coup d’état, residents of Yangon encounter nighttime robbery, petty street crime, vehicle break-ins and burglaries, home invasions, and homicide at rates similar to other major cities in Southeast Asia. Reports of criminal activity are difficult to corroborate due to the lack of official reporting or an easily searchable national database. Local administrators and police stations employ a paper-based crime and incident reporting system at local stations. Crimes of opportunity most commonly reported by expatriates include pickpocketing, theft of unattended possessions in public places, and bag snatchings. Exercise the same level of caution in Yangon as you would in any major U.S. city.
Violent crime and use of weapons in such crimes are not common, especially against foreigners. In the event of an armed confrontation, immediately hand over the desired property to avoid escalation or injury. A foreign diplomat was a victim of an attempted home break-in in the Golden Valley residential neighborhood in Bahan Township in August 2021. Although the intruder was able to access the diplomat’s home, they retreated upon hearing the occupant stir. Supervise all workers in your residence. Keep doors and windows secured in residences and hotel rooms. Do not store valuable items or large amounts of currency at home or in plain view as they may attract the attention of criminals.
Financial fraud is increasing. While Burma is still a largely cash-based society, this is changing, particularly in the denser urban areas where many stores, hotels, and restaurants catering to tourists accept credit cards as a form of payment. You can find ATMs in larger urban areas, but it is common for them to run out of cash, especially on local paydays. Particularly since the coup, financial institutions have not reliably replenished ATMs. Local currency can be acquired through local banks or on the informal exchange market. Bring an ample amount of crisp U.S. hundred dollar bills for the duration of your visit as money changers will reject visibly worn currency. Travelers will often carry large sums of local currency to more rural locations where credit cards are not accepted. Avoid displaying large sums of cash in public.
The Ministry of Immigration and Population website lists areas of Burma to which foreigners and tourists are not allowed to travel, usually due to conflict; and areas requiring “official permission” before travelling.
Foreigners traveling overland outside major cities/tourist destinations may encounter challenges in communicating without a Burmese-speaking interpreter. In addition, security forces at checkpoints on some major highways may scrutinize your movements and request identification documents or government approvals to continue your travel.
Kidnapping Threat
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Kidnapping “K” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Burma.
In 2019, several notable hostage incidents and isolating events occurred in Rakhine and northern Shan State involving both citizens of Burma and foreign nationals, to include in one case U.S. citizens.
Terrorism
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Yangon as being a LOW -threat location for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Terrorism “T” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Burma.
There is no evidence at present to suggest transnational terrorist organizations maintain an active capacity in Burma. The U.S. Government has not designated Burma a state sponsor of terrorism, nor is Burma implicated in knowingly permitting foreign terrorist fighters to seek refuge or transit in the country. However, transnational terrorists may pursue targets anywhere in the world. Al-Qa’ida (AQ) in the Indian Subcontinent has threatened attacks in Burma in response to the Rakhine crisis and urged AQ regional aid, training, and weapons. Consider that any large public gatherings could become attractive targets for terrorists. Prior to the 2021 coup, Burma hosted numerous large public events, including a Papal visit, the Pan-Asian Games, and an Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit, all of which took place without major security incidents.
Political Violence and Civil Unrest
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Yangon as being a CRITICAL-threat location for political violence, with the majority of actions being directed at the military regime, and not against or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Civil Unrest “U” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Burma, indicating that demonstrations, protests, and strikes occur, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability for adequate response. Civil unrest can develop quickly without prior notification, interrupting logistics and services. Avoid demonstration activity, as even those planned to remain peaceful have the potential to turn violent.
Elections/Political Stability
On February 1, 2021, Burma’s military forces usurped the democratically elected civilian government via a military coup d’état and declared a state of emergency, transferring all executive, legislative, and judicial authorities to a State Administration Council (SAC). The SAC is an authoritarian military-run council, led by armed forces Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, which re-established full military rule in the country. The coup effectively dissolved all national and sub-national legislatures, including the Union Parliament, forcing many of its elected members to flee or face potential arrest. Citing unproven claims of widespread election fraud, the military regime declared that the coup was a legal transfer of power in line with the 2008 constitution’s emergency provisions. The regime also targeted the labor union movement, arrested union leaders and members, and declared 16 labor unions to be illegal.
On February 5, 2021, 17 democratically elected parliamentarians from the NLD and allied political parties formed the Committee Representing the Union Parliament (CRPH), which subsequently declared the regime as illegitimate and the 2008 constitution abolished, before forming the self-proclaimed “National Unity Government” (NUG) on April 16, 2021. When extending the state of emergency on August 1, 2021, regime officials announced that the SAC would be a “caretaker” government before holding future elections. As of August 2024, the regime has repeatedly extended the state of emergency and has not yet held elections. The military regime’s undermining of democratic processes and the rule of law, facilitation of corruption, and commission of serious human rights abuses exacerbated risks to foreign businesses operating in Burma or providing financial services to Burmese businesses.
Prior to the coup, fighting between the country’s military and various ethnic armed organizations (EAO) and militia forces within the country persisted in several regions, including parts of Kachin, Shan, Rakhine, and Chin states. Immediately after the coup, a “Spring Revolution” emerged as a nationwide pro-democracy protest and the civil disobedience movement (CDM) disrupted Burma’s governing institution. As the regime responded with repressive tactics such as mass arrests of political opponents and the employment of violent tactics against peaceful protesters, fighting between EAOs and the military escalated. Subsequently, armed opposition forces with varying degrees of connection to the NUG emerged and began referring to themselves as “People’s Defense Forces” (PDF). Many PDF groups cooperated with and trained under EAOs in Burma.
Fighting between the military regime’s forces, EAOs, and militia forces continues in parts of Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Shan, Rakhine, Mon, and Chin States, and in Mandalay, Sagaing, Magway, and Tanintharyi Regions. Travelers should avoid travel to these areas. Local PDF groups actively operate around the country. Fighting is not limited to clashes between regime and pro-democracy groups, and travelers are cautioned of the potential for an isolating event in cases where the regime may limit access to highways and airports.
Avoid traveling in border areas with a history of armed conflict. While PDF and EAO groups have not demonstrated any intent to target U.S. interests, civilians may find themselves caught in the crossfire. Some groups have warned the populace in advance of planned or impending attacks. Regime security forces may also respond to security incidents with escalating retaliatory action.
Intercommunal conflicts, public demonstrations, and outbreaks of violence continue to present challenges for U.S. private-sector organizations and could jeopardize U.S. investments and operations, even if they are not directly targeted. The regime military and security forces continue to respond against civilians with brutal force (including artillery and air bombardment), establish flash checkpoints that lead to arbitrary arrests, detain journalists, and conduct nightly neighborhood raids against alleged pro-democracy actors.
Avoid large crowds, demonstrations, and political activity, and maintain a high level of situational awareness. Often, regime forces will respond with excess use of force and may indiscriminately employ violent tactics against anyone in the area.
Intercommunal tension remains high in Rakhine State between the ethnic Rakhine and the Rohingya, a group that is not one of the officially recognized ethnic groups and which many in Burma label as illegal immigrants. As the Rakhine are overwhelmingly Buddhist while the Rohingya are overwhelmingly Muslim, this conflict sometimes takes on a religious dimension, but the Rakhine also deeply resent the perceived oppression by the Buddhist Bamar that are the ethnic majority in the country. Because the government does not recognize Rohingya as an ethnic group, they must undergo additional requirements to receive residency cards and are often unable to obtain identification or travel documents. In addition, they face abuse, institutionalized discrimination, and restrictions on freedom of movement, as well as a lack of access to education, livelihoods, and basic services. As a result, many have fled to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. In 2017, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked 30 security force outposts. The Burma military’s “grossly disproportional1” response led over 700,000 Rohingya refugees to flee into Bangladesh. The situation in Rakhine is now more complicated due to ongoing conflict between the military and the Arakha Army. Fighting has spread across the central and northern Rakhine and southern Chin States. Intercommunal tensions remain high.
Protests & Demonstrations
During the first 30 days following the February 2021 military coup d’état, demonstrators – peaking in the hundreds of thousands – disrupted and, in some cases, stopped traffic within and outside Yangon. With pro-democracy and military regime actions concentrated on each other, direct threats to the U.S. Mission in Burma were limited.
After the coup, the regime cracked down on pro-democracy and ethnic groups in violent acts with relative impunity. At the same time, the formation of the NUG, composed of deposed lawmakers and members of parliament, became the unofficial voice of the movement. While initially pursuing peaceful resistance through mass walkouts, the military’s violent crackdown on unarmed demonstrators prompted the formation of PDF groups. By summer 2021, various PDFs surfaced in townships across Burma to oppose the military and those they saw as collaborating with it.
Initially, PDF groups conducted operations with no centralized mission structure, as evidenced by indiscriminate attacks on non-regime affiliated targets such as shopping malls, bus stops, and gas stations. As the insurgency progressed, some PDF groups announced operational guidelines refining their missions to project force more directly against the regime (security forces) and regime-affiliated targets (ward administrators, informants, businesses).
Although the frequency of mass protests has dwindled due to the regime’s brutal repression of demonstrators, pro-democracy groups in several townships have conducted flash-mob style protests, which typically dissipate immediately to avoid reprisal. Regime security forces have arrested demonstrators for protesting without permits, an offense which carries a prison term of not more than one year or a fine or both under the Peaceful Assembly Act. The regime has also employed deadly force and arrested demonstrators, journalists, and spectators in proximity to such events. On May 26, 2024, security forces fired live rounds at a group of five anti-regime protesters who had hung a banner from a railway bridge in Yangon and burned a copy of the 2008 constitution. The protesters fled and no one was injured or apprehended in the incident.
Anti-U.S./Anti-Western Sentiment
Western advocacy on Rohingya issues has stirred some degree of anti-western sentiment due to perceptions of unequal treatment or bias among certain ethnic groups. A degree of anti-U.S. sentiment permeates the sphere of U.S.-sanctioned business entities, which as a rule are controlled by or affiliated with the military regime. Pro-regime groups have used social media to spread regime propaganda and disinformation, in many instances critical of the West. Editorials from pro-regime media outlets are often anti-Western but are even more often critical of PRC “meddling” in Myanmar’s internal affairs.
Law Enforcement
The Myanmar Police Force (MPF) is primarily responsible for internal security and falls under the regime’s Ministry of Home Affairs, whose minister is a military general. The operationally distinct Border Guard Police is a special department of the MPF deployed in land-border areas as well as to certain checkpoints and regions identified at risk for insurgency. The armed forces under the Defense Ministry are responsible for national security, with most actions focused internally on the regime’s ongoing conflict with pro-democracy actors and ethnic armed organizations. Members of the regime’s security forces continue to commit atrocities and violations of human rights across the country.
MPF Traffic Police enforcement of traffic regulations is often haphazard or used a means to solicit bribes. Traffic Police may extort motorists for “tea money” in response to low pay and low morale. If this happens to you, do not pay bribes or on-the-spot fines; do not comply with requests for a gift. If an officer persists, politely ask to speak with a supervisor.
If the police seek to detain you, identify yourself as a U.S. citizen and try to identify the ranking officer’s name and badge number. Police must notify the Embassy when arresting or detaining a U.S. citizen; however, delayed notifications are common. If arrested, assert this right and request to speak with a representative from the U.S. Embassy by calling (95)-1-753-6-509. The U.S. Embassy liaises with local law enforcement officials and can assist U.S. citizens in emergencies.
Police Response
Few police officers speak English. Police capability, responsiveness, and professionalism may appear inconsistent with U.S. standards. Police units are often under-funded, under-staffed, poorly equipped or trained, and suffer from limited resources and corruption. Many crimes go unreported or uninvestigated.
After the coup, PDF groups and other pro-democracy actors targeted regime and regime-affiliated personnel and facilities, including police. This activity prompted law enforcement authorities to install reinforced barriers around police stations and government buildings to protect against explosives. Local government administrators in particular have been consistently targeted in assassination attempts. There have been reports of MPF officers being ambushed by PDF groups as they respond to incidents, resulting in casualties on both sides.
Travelers with Special Considerations
For specific traveler concerns in Burma, review the local laws and circumstances on the Department of State’s Country Information Page.
Rule of Law, Arbitrary Detention, Official Harassment, Corruption, & Transparency
The U.S. Department of State has included a Risk of Wrongful Detention “D” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Burma, indicating that there is a continued risk of the wrongful detention of U.S. nationals by Burmese authorities.
Although the international community monitors atrocities on all sides of the conflict, there continues to be almost complete impunity for past and ongoing abuses by the regime. There is no credible information that the regime has taken actions to prosecute or punish officials responsible for human rights abuses outside of politically motivated charges against pro-democracy or opposition supporters. In addition to human rights abuses during and after the military coup, the military faces allegations of serious human rights abuses against members of multiple minority groups in Burma, most notably in the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Shan, and Rakhine States.
There are credible claims that some EAO and PDF groups have committed human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, physical abuse or degrading treatment, and failure to protect local populations in conflict zones. These abuses rarely result in investigations or prosecutions.
Corruption remains a serious barrier to commerce and investment and pervades the government and economy.
Corruption is widespread in all dimensions of political life, especially in the judicial system. Petty extortion by police is paralleled by more serious graft at higher levels, such as demanding bribes from victims to conduct criminal investigations.
U.S. businesses should conduct enhanced due diligence given U.S. and other sanctions before entering contracts and other business arrangements with Burma-based firms and individuals. Refer to the Supplemental Business Advisory Highlighting Continued Risks involved in conducting business in Buma.
Aside from the security environment, U.S. firms consider the lack of clarity surrounding the regime’s commercial laws and regulations, and lack of adequate infrastructure (especially reliable electricity), to be the most serious impediments to doing business. A non-transparent and protectionist import permit system often blocks imports.
The limitations of rule of law are an impediment for U.S. private-sector organizations. The judicial system is archaic, and decisions are often made through personal relationships or bribes. Burma suffers from an antiquated legal system and outdated legislation; many laws are vague and often subject to manipulation.
Cybersecurity
Regime-imposed internet and telecommunication restrictions, as well as armed conflict, have degraded the quality, reliability, and security of telecommunications infrastructure in Burma. Several conflict areas in Burma have no internet or mobile network service, while service is generally more reliable in larger cities. Secure internet access is even more limited, raising cybersecurity and privacy risks for all internet users in country, including businesses. Since 2021, regime authorities have used their physical control of key telecommunications infrastructure and their regulatory authority to slow, interrupt, block, and control access to the internet and other telecommunication services. In May 2024, regime authorities abruptly began blocking some VPN services that provide a layer of additional security and privacy to online users. The regime’s Ministry of Transport and Communication drafted a Cyber Security Law in 2022 that proposed criminalizing the use of VPNs, but the regime has not adopted the law as of August 2024. All online users should routinely review their online privacy and security settings and avoid accessing restricted content, such as politically sensitive websites, while in country. Users should refrain from posting sensitive messages, statements, or photos that could criminally implicate an individual in the eyes of the regime.
Burma is also a key node for sophisticated “cyber scam” centers that often double as casinos and are controlled by transnational criminal organizations. Many of these scam centers are in Burma’s border areas where law enforcement is limited. The centers are known to target victims globally, including in Burma, often by making an initial contact online and gradually developing victims to enable financial fraud schemes, trafficking in persons, or narcotics smuggling, among other illicit activities. Individuals should avoid traveling to areas where scam centers are known to be present and should exercise heightened vigilance against cyber scams when communicating electronically, including via e-mail, text message, secure messaging applications, and social media. Suspicious messages may include unsolicited or unusual offers of employment, investment opportunities, or paid travel from known and unknown online contacts.
Import/Export Restrictions
Importing unmanned aerial systems (drones) without prior government permission and flying them in sensitive areas can result in criminal penalties, including jail time and the permanent confiscation of the drone. Sensitive areas include government buildings, famous tourist sites, and religious buildings. It is not always clear what constitutes a sensitive area, making all recreational use of drones inadvisable. Authorities have recently imprisoned several foreigners, including a U.S. citizen, for flying drones in sensitive locations. Those wishing to bring a drone to Burma should seek official permission from the regime.
Avoid responding to unsolicited opportunities to make money, including business opportunities that seem too good to be true. Beware of merchants selling gems, gold, and/or semi-precious stones; purchasing these items could result in substantial loss of money and/or a violation of local or international laws. Do not purchase gems or minerals from an unlicensed source. See the Department of State and the FBI pages for information on scams.
A country-specific listing of items/goods prohibited from being exported to the country or that are otherwise restricted is available from the U.S. International Trade Agency website.
Additional resources and reports can be found in the OSAC Traveler Toolkit.
