What are Drawdowns and How do They Impact Constituents?

Summary

From time to time, circumstances warrant a change in the staffing of a U.S. embassy or consulate (hereafter referred to as a “post”). This change can be temporary or for a sustained period, and it can occur for various reasons, including outbreak of conflict, rise in terrorism (or threats of terrorism), a rise in anti-American sentiment, disease outbreak, inclement weather, or a breakdown in civil structures.

The safety and security of the local environment is routinely assessed using a Decision Points framework that is a combination of operating assumptions, risk indicators, and actions to consider. Overall, when decision points are met and the conditions warrant, the post may reduce the number of personnel (staff and/or dependents) – which can be on an authorized or ordered basis, or a combination of the two categories.

When drawdowns occur, the post will make an official announcement of the change in staffing status through the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs. OSAC has found that any change in diplomatic staffing may be a decision point for the U.S. private sector in-country to consider its own staffing needs.

The most recent statistics from the U.S. Government Accountability Office indicate that during fiscal years 2013-2016, departures were authorized or ordered 31 times at 23 U.S. diplomatic posts abroad in response to diverse threats. (See image.)

Introduction

The change in operating status at a diplomatic facility is not an arbitrary decision or one that is taken lightly. There is an official process enumerated through legal guidance with numerous decision makers involved to change the status. Before a decision to change an operating status is made, there may be signs of unrest or other security-related decision points and responses that will have been passed -- possibly noted in Alerts or in OSAC reporting -- that the private sector would likely be monitoring concurrently.

Constant monitoring of signs of a deteriorating security environment and adjusting travel policies to address them should be an ongoing process. We encourage you to also develop decision points or indicators that the security situation on the ground may be changing for the worse, and identify what your response to those changes could be, and how you would execute those changes. Decision points encourage a re-evaluation of the current threat landscape while allowing flexibility on an organization’s response.

Tripwires attach certain developments to corresponding changes in security posture. The ultimate goal of tripwire planning is to help crisis management teams determine when a security situation has deteriorated to the point that it requires a change in an organization's security posture. It is a proactive approach to security planning that facilitates quick, effective decision-making. For more information, please refer to OSAC’s “Tripwire Emergency Planning.” A diplomatic post drawdown should not be the first tripwire for private-sector action.

Notably, a status change at a diplomatic mission does not mandate a change within the private sector. Decision makers must evaluate the local security environment in the context of the security needs and capabilities of their organizations. But, a drawdown of any proportion is likely indicative of a high risk to the safety of most/all U.S. citizens. Further, the remaining post staffing means that there are less resources available to assist U.S. citizens; therefore, we encourage organizations to develop contingency plans that do not rely on U.S. government assistance.

What are the Forms of Drawdown?

When there is increased danger to the lives of post staff or their family members, the Chief of Mission, which is often an Ambassador but can be a Chargé d’Affairs or other comparable position, may initiate request for a drawdown of the staffing levels of that particular post as a means to safeguard personnel and property. A decision to request a change in operating status is typically done in consultation with the advice of post’s Emergency Action Committee (EAC), a group of subject matter experts designated by the Chief of Mission to provide guidance in preparing for and responding to potential changes in risk that might impact the safety and security of the post and the U.S. citizens within that post’s area of responsibility. Unless there is imminent danger to the lives of post personnel, the request must be approved by the Under Secretary of State for Management in Washington, D.C.  The following are three types of changes to staffing levels at any post:

• Authorized departure: Under an authorized departure, certain post staff and family members can choose to depart the post voluntarily in advance of their normal rotation, when U.S. national interests or an imminent threat to life requires it, by submitting a request through the Post’s EAC, which forwards it to the Chief of Mission and is approved by the Under Secretary for Management.

• Ordered departure: Under an ordered departure, certain post staff and/or family members are required to depart the post. Ordered departure is mandatory and may be initiated by the Chief of Mission or the Secretary of State. In an Ordered Departure, staff will be moved to a designated safe haven, which may be in the United States, another country, or even another post in the same country.

Authorized and ordered departures can be tailored to fit the particular circumstances. State guidance establishes that authorized and ordered departures are approved for an initial period of 30 days, which may be extended in 30-day increments for a maximum of 180 days.

• Suspended operations: This is a term used to denote a post that has ceased operations. During this period, U.S. direct-hire personnel and their families are ordered to depart post. It is possible that some locally employed staff may remain on premises to maintain the facilities. Diplomatic relations with the host government are usually maintained; it is not a revocation of diplomatic relations with the host country. Suspended operations may be initiated by the Chief of Mission or Secretary of State, but must be approved by the Secretary of State or his designate.

• Unaccompanied Post: A post at which no family members or members of household are authorized to reside. If a post continues on ordered departure status for 180 continuous days, the Department of State can change that post’s classification status to unaccompanied. At unaccompanied posts, only post staff and their post-employed family members may be present. At certain unaccompanied posts, employment for family members may be prohibited.

Impact to Private Sector

There is no central public repository to list which diplomatic posts are on which departure status; however, if a post is on departure status, the corresponding U.S. Travel Advisory will be rated as either a Level 3 or a Level 4 to reflect the threats to safety or security that prompted the reduction of personnel, and will note limitations in services to U.S. citizens. The following examples highlight different drawdown-related decisions taken recently by posts around the world, including ones that might require different positions for different types of personnel. (Please note that nomenclature changed from “Travel Warning” to “Travel Advisory” in 2018; the Department of State no longer issues “Travel Warnings.”)

• “On April 20, 2018, the Department ordered the departure of non-emergency U.S. government employees.” – Travel Advisory: Central African Republic
• “On April 23, 2018, the U.S. government ordered the departure of U.S. government family members and authorized the departure of U.S. government personnel.” – Travel Advisory: Nicaragua
• “On February 11, 2015, due to the deteriorating security situation in Sanaa, the Department of State suspended embassy operations and U.S. Embassy Sanaa American staff were relocated out of the country.” – Travel Warning: Yemen
• “On September 5, [2017,] the Department authorized the voluntary departure of U.S. government employees and their family members [from the Dominican Republic] due to Hurricane Irma.” – Travel Warning: Dominican Republic
• “On September 6, [2017,] the Department ordered the departure of non-essential U.S. government employees and their family members [from the Bahamas] due to Hurricane Irma.” – Travel Warning: Bahamas

In these cases, the impact to the private sector is that as staffing is drawn down, to include American Citizens Services staff, posts may not be able to respond to, aid, or assist remaining U.S. citizens until the drawdown is lifted and staffing is replenished.

There are also situations where travel to specific areas may be restricted for U.S. government employees within a country, but not elevated to the same magnitude as a departure. This may be due to spiking crime or terrorism, anti-American sentiment, election-related violence, drug trafficking activity, disease outbreaks, natural disasters, or other security concerns.

• “The U.S. Government has limited ability to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens in Gracias a Dios, as U.S. government employees are restricted from traveling to the area.” – Travel Advisory: Honduras

• “The U.S. Government has limited ability to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens in Pakistan due to the security environment. Travel by U.S. government personnel within Pakistan is restricted, and additional restrictions on movements by U.S. government personnel outside of U.S. diplomatic facilities may be put in place at any time, depending on local circumstances and security conditions, which can change suddenly. The U.S. Government is [also] unable to provide any consular services to U.S. citizens from the Consulate General in Peshawar.” – Travel Advisory: Pakistan

OSAC Crime and Safety Reports may also indicate when U.S. diplomatic posts restrict domestic travel for U.S. Government employees. Typically noted in the “Other Areas of Concern” section, these are not restrictions issued based on Consular Affairs messaging, but instead are those requiring advanced approval and/or enhanced security for essential travel. These restrictions should also be considered by the U.S. private sector.

Guidance

Just because a post has changed its operating status or restricts domestic travel, there is no requirement for U.S. private-sector organizations with operations in the same area to adjust theirs. When a post decides to decrease or move staff out of the area, there is likely a high risk to the safety of U.S. citizens. Further, the post may be unable to provide much, or any, support – including visa issuance, lost passport support, repatriation, or evacuation assistance -- should remaining U.S. citizens require assistance. Each organization must set their structural risk tolerance, along with allowing for differing individual risk tolerance of their personnel.

Under the Department of State’s “No Double Standard” policy, a post is required to share the same relevant threat information with private U.S. citizens as the post communicates to the official U.S. government community. Beyond that, the actions the Department of State takes, and the services it can provide, depend on the nature of the crisis. In some instances, the Department of State only provides information on conditions in the country, such as warning about areas of unrest, how and where to seek help, and other useful advice. In more serious situations, the Department of State may recommend that U.S. citizens leave the foreign country.

If the Department of State is able to provide departure assistance to private U.S. citizens, it is important to know that it is not free and may have restrictions (e.g., in general, pets cannot be accommodated, luggage may be limited to one carry-on only, etc.) depending on circumstances; there will likely be high financial costs associated (all evacuees are required to execute a promissory note, called a DS-5528, prior to embarkation; personal information may be populated into forms in advance). And, an evacuation will be to a nearby location, not necessarily to a private-sector headquarters or to the United States. Consequently, having a tailored and systematic decision-making plan, including specific tripwires and consideration of U.S. government guidance, should the operating climate begin to deteriorate, will likely help private-sector organizations working in more tenuous security environments avoid the need for a costly and stressful evacuation.

Relevant Sources

• 3 FAM 3770
• GAO Report: State Department Should Take Steps to Improve Emergency Preparedness (July 2017)
• DS-5528
• 22 U.S.C. 2671(b) (2) (A)