Published: January 23, 2025
This report is intended to supplement the U.S. Department of State Niger Travel Advisory and Niger Country Information Page.
Embassy & Consulate Contact Information
U.S. Embassy Abuja:
Rue des Ambassades, Niamey.
Tel: +227 20-72-26-61/62/63/64; After-hour emergencies: +227-20-72-31-41 or +227-99-49-90-33.
Hours of Operation: Monday-Thursday: 0800-1730, Friday 0800-1300.
OSAC Country Chapter(s)
There is no OSAC Country Chapter active in Niger.
For information on U.S. private-sector security engagement in Zambia, contact OSAC’s Africa team with any questions.
Niger Travel Advisory
The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses that travelers should reconsider travel to Niger due to crime, civil unrest, terrorism, and kidnapping.
Crime
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Niamey as being a CRITICAL-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Crime “C” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Niger, indicating that there may be widespread violent crime and/or organized crime present in the country, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond to serious crimes.
Non-violent crimes (e.g., pickpocketing, purse snatching, backpack/cell phone theft) are present in major cities, notably in/around places where Westerners gather and markets.
Violent crimes (e.g., muggings, assaults) are not as common as non-violent crimes, and typically occur after dark. Assailants may be aggressive and display a weapon during a robbery; knives are the most frequently employed weapon, as some Nigeriens carry knives or machetes as part of their normal dress.
Vehicle thefts are prevalent in Niamey. Most carjackings reported to police occur along Niger’s southern border, which has seen a rise in criminality, especially in the Maradi and Zinder regions. Instability in Tillaberi near the Burkinabe border has increased in the past year.
There have been reports of attacks on people leaving banks and ATMs, primarily at night. Westerners have been targeted as part of these attacks.
There are some reports of residential robbery in Niamey. Home invasions and residential robberies occur primarily after dark and can be violent. There have been recent incidents in which assailants attacked residential guards or occupants. Although thieves typically choose to rob homes without visible residential security measures, these measures have not stopped burglars in some cases, including those targeting diplomat and NGO residences. In addition, there have been numerous reports of commercial and NGO office burglaries.
Kidnapping Threat
The U.S. Department of State has included a Kidnapping “K” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Niger, indicating that criminal or terrorist individuals or groups have threatened to and/or have seized or detained and threatened to kill, injure, or continue to detain individuals in order to compel a third party (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing something as a condition of release.
The October 2020 kidnapping of a U.S. Citizen living in Massalata, southern Niger, is a perfect example of the continued threat of kidnapping faced by Westerners in Niger. Ultimately, the U.S. citizen was rescued in northern Nigeria, but the threat of kidnapping is still high, including within Niamey. In March 2023, an American aid worker kidnapped by likely JNIM militants from his home in Abalak was released in Mali. There is a persistent threat of kidnapping of Westerners in Diffa and Tillabéri regions; some NGOs have scaled back operations and are reviewing travel/movement of Western personnel more carefully in this area.
Although the U.S. government places the highest priority on the safe recovery of kidnapped U.S. citizens, it is U.S. policy not to make concessions to kidnappers. Consequently, the type of assistance that the U.S. Government can provide to kidnap victims is limited, as is Nigerien capacity to support a rescue operation.
Terrorism
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Niamey as being a HIGH-threat location for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Terrorism “T” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Niger, indicating that terrorist attacks have occurred and/or specific threats against civilians, groups, or other targets may exist. Review the latest U.S. Department of State Country Report on Terrorism for Niger.
Terrorist groups continue to plot kidnappings and possible attacks in Niger. Terrorists may attack with little/no warning, targeting foreign and local government facilities and areas Westerners frequent. U.S. citizens should reduce exposure to locations frequented by Westerners such as restaurants and nightclubs. Externally based extremist groups have crossed the border and carried out multiple lethal attacks on Nigerien security forces. These attacks have increased in frequency and lethality in the past year.
Niger has experienced terrorism, mainly in the form of kidnapping-for-ransom (KFR) and clashes between security forces and extremist militants. The country faces threats from Mali-based terrorist groups, which include regional affiliates of al-Qa’ida and ISIS (e.g., ISIS in the Greater Sahara, or ISGS), as well as Nigeria-based terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram and ISIS West Africa (ISIS-WA). These groups include Nigerien members. Mali-based terrorist groups in particular have increasingly targeted local, regional, and international security forces in Mali and neighboring countries.
Mali-based terrorist groups have shown a propensity for retaliating against countries that participate in regional counterterrorism efforts and/or support U.S. and French military presence in the region. In December 2023, France completed its withdrawal of military forces from Niger which followed total withdrawals from Mali and Burkina Faso in 2022. In August 2023, Niger reportedly requested help from the Russian mercenary group Wagner to provide regime security and counter-terrorism support. After the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Niger in September 2024, the U.S. Government footprint in Niger is substantially smaller than in previous years.
Terrorist organizations continue to carry out extensive attacks in Niger. There were two main fronts of attacks: BH and ISIS-WA in the southeast; and JNIM and the ISIS-GS in the west and northwest. The Tillaberi region, the tri-border zone where Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali meet, has the highest concentration and incident rate of kinetic activity from militants operating in the area. Some notable recent terrorist incidents include:
- On January 11, an Austrian national was kidnapped by armed men from her home in Agadez. She had been a development worker in the area for 25+ years.
- On December 5, 2024, unidentified militants conducted an attack on a public transport bus travelling between Bankilare and Tera in the Tillaberi region. The attack resulted in the death of at least 21 civilians.
- On August 13, 2024, unidentified militants attacked residents in the villages of Mamassi Ganganiya, Tchabi et Amara, Ayorou commune, in Tillaberi region resulting in the deaths of at least 23 civilians. An additional five civilians were reported missing.
- On March 19, 2024, unidentified militants attacked a military patrol between Teguey and Bankilare. The attack resulted in the deaths of 30 militants and 23 soldiers.
- On December 31, 2023, unidentified militants on motorcycles attacked civilians in the Niger-Burkina Faso border towns of Amara and Loudji, resulting in the death of 11 civilians.
- On December 29, 2023, unidentified militants conducted an IED attack on a military patrol vehicle traveling in Ouro Gueladjo, located approximately 70 km outside of the capital of Niamey. The attack resulted in the death of one soldier and wounded five others.
Political Violence and Civil Unrest
The U.S. Department of State has assessed Niger as being a HIGH-threat location for political violence directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Civil Unrest “U” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Niger. Civil unrest can develop quickly without prior notice, often interrupting logistics and services. Avoid demonstration activity, as even those planned to remain peaceful have the potential to turn violent.
Elections/Political Stability
On February 23, 2021, the former President, Mohamed Bazoum took office after the ten-year term of former President Mahamadou Issoufou concluded. This election was marred by civil unrest, which at times turned violent. The period of civil unrest resulted in the death of two individuals; authorities are continuing to investigate the incidents.
On March 31, 2021, two days prior to the swearing in of the President-elect, several armed men fired on the Presidential Palace, in what some have called an attempted coup. The Presidential Guards returned fire, until the unknown assailants fled the area. Several arrests have followed.
Throughout 2021 and early 2022, several media reports of attempted coups were reported that resulted in the arrests of government and military officials. On April 8, former Nigerien Minister of the Interior, Cisse Ibrahim Ousmane, was arrested in Niamey for his alleged role in the attempted coup of March 21, 2021. He was transferred to Brini N’gaoure prison in Dosso region pending his trial.
On July 26, 2023, Niger’s Presidential Guard detained Mohamed Bazoum and assumed control over the country reportedly in response to growing insecurity caused by jihadists operating throughout the country. The Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) threatened military intervention if Bazoum was not re-instated as President. On August 20, General Abdourahamne Tiani was declared head of state for a transition period lasting no more than three years and declared Niger would defend itself from military intervention. In the aftermath of the coup, the military leaders detained a number of former government leaders and political leaders from Bazoum’s administration. At the time of this reports release, Bazoum remains in detention in Niger.
Protest & Demonstrations
Niger experiences periodic violent demonstrations. Large and small street demonstrations occur regularly, often near government buildings, university campuses, or other gathering places (such as public parks) or blocking the main bridge over the Niger River. Demonstrations have involved rock throwing, tire burning, and setting cars on fire, especially at key intersections in Niamey. There have been occasional reports of rock-throwing demonstrators targeting NGO and diplomatic vehicles, but none in recent years. Student marches frequently protest various education-related issues. Trade and service unions and other associations often protest for better wages and working conditions.
In the aftermath of the July coup, demonstrations in support of the coup took place throughout the country. Protesters coalesced around the French embassy, calling for the withdrawal of French forces and demonstrating support for Russia. Protesters reportedly lit the door of the French embassy on fire before security forces broke up the protests. At its apex, the crowd ballooned to an estimated 100,000 people. However, no protests of this magnitude have occurred seen since the French departure.
Anti-U.S./Anti-Western Sentiment
There is little anti-U.S. sentiment among the general population. Due to a French colonial history, anti-France sentiment sometimes comes to the surface.
Law Enforcement
The emergency line in Niger is 17.
The National Police is the main law enforcement force for cities, villages and falls under the Interior Ministry (MOI). Officers typically wear black berets.
The National Guard also falls under the MOI and is charged with guarding prisons and government buildings. While dressed like soldiers but typically with red berets, National Guard members have civilian arrest authority, can conduct checkpoints, and can be called on to quell civil disturbances.
The Gendarmerie falls under the Defense Ministry, and also has civilian arrest authority. Gendarmes typically cover rural areas and roadways; they typically wear green berets.
Every 90 days, the parliament reviews the state of emergency declaration in effect in the Diffa Region and in parts of Tahoua and Tillaberi Regions. Civilian authorities generally maintain effective control over security forces, although at times individual soldiers and police act independently of the command structure. Members of the security forces have committed some abuses.
Police Response
The police sometimes lack the resources (e.g., vehicles, fuel) to respond immediately to calls for assistance.
U.S. citizens who are victims of crime should immediately contact the local police. If the police are unable to respond, U.S. citizens should contact the U.S. Embassy. If security forces detain or arrest a U.S. citizen, request that the police contact the U.S. Embassy; you may need to repeat the request.
Lack of actual street addresses may pose challenges when reporting an emergency. Callers should describe the location of the emergency using landmarks, which may be difficult for foreigners or anyone unfamiliar with the area.
Travelers with Special Considerations
For specific traveler concerns in Niger, review the local laws and circumstances on the Department of State’s Country Information Page.
Rule of Law, Arbitrary Detention, Official Harassment, Corruption, & Transparency
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Risk of Wrongful Detention “D” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Niger.
The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, and the law prohibits arbitrary detention without charge for more than 48 hours and provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her detention, with some exceptions. The exception being a 15-day detention period of suspects when the crime is related to terrorism or transnational organized crime. The National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) has publicly revoked the citizenship of numerous Nigeriens in the past year, citing uncorroborated ties to terrorism or criminal activities.
Civil servants often demand bribes to provide public services. A poorly trained civil service and weak administrative controls compound corruption. Other contributing factors include poverty, low salaries, politicization of the public service, traditional kinship and ethnic allegiances, a culture of impunity, and the lack of civic education. Data from a World Justice Project survey published in March 2020 showed that citizens viewed executive and legislative officials as using public office for private gain.
The High Authority for the Fight against Corruption and Related Offenses (HALCIA) actively investigates official corruption and has made several official reports, some of which led to punitive action by the government, including arrests. HALCIA also stopped several public procurement tenders due to concerns of improprieties. Presidential control of its budget, however, limits HALCIA’s independence and ability to investigate allegations.
Cybersecurity
Due to the lack of cyber infrastructure and the relatively low rate of internet penetration, the prevalence of cybercrime is thought to be low. However, information on cybercrime trends in Niger may be lacking due to the limited abilities of Niger’s security forces and law enforcement officials to track, investigate, and prevent cybercrime.
Import/Export Restrictions
There are no restrictions on the use of satellite phones.
A country-specific listing of items/goods prohibited from being exported to the country or that are otherwise restricted is available from the U.S. International Trade Agency website.
Additional resources and reports can be found in the OSAC Traveler Toolkit.
