Published: December 30, 2024
This report is intended to supplement the U.S. Department of State DRC Travel Advisory and DRC Country Information Page.
Embassy & Consulate Contact Information
U.S. Embassy Kinshasa:
310 Avenue des Aviateurs, Gombe district, Kinshasa.
Tel: +243-81-556-0151/0152.
Hours of Operation: Monday-Thursday, 0730-1715; Friday, 0730-1230.
U.S. Consulate City (with website hyperlinked)
Full address
+Phone Number
Emergencies: +Phone Number. Hours.
OSAC Country Chapter(s)
Kinshasa has an active OSAC Country Chapter that meets quarterly or as needed.
Contact OSAC’s Africa team with any questions.
DRC Travel Advisory
The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses that travelers should reconsider travel to DRC due to crime and civil unrest. Do not travel to North Kivu province due to crime, civil unrest, terrorism, armed conflict, and kidnapping; Ituri province due to crime, civil unrest, terrorism, armed conflict, and kidnapping; or the eastern DRC region and the three Kasai provinces (Kasai, Kasai-Oriental, Kasai-Central) due to crime, civil unrest, armed conflict, and kidnapping.
Crime
The U.S. Department of State has assessed the Kinshasa as being a CRITICAL-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Crime “C” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), indicating that there may be widespread violent crime and/or organized crime present in the country, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond to serious crimes.
There is no functional national emergency response number. Emergency and security services emergency contact information are not readily available. Do not rely on a timely response.
Private U.S. citizens should contact American Citizen Services at the Embassy for emergency support or guidance by calling +243 972 616 193 during business hours or +243 815 560 151 after-hours or emailing ACSKinshasa@state.gov.
Crimes of opportunity (mainly for financial gain) are the most reported incidents against U.S. citizens in Kinshasa and throughout the DRC. Most reported incidents consist of various forms of theft such as pickpocketing, burglary, and robbery. Petty crime may be more likely in public places and areas of congregation. Criminal elements do not typically single out U.S. citizens, but may view them as targets of opportunity based on perceived affluence or vulnerability. Reported crime trends in Kinshasa are as follows:
- Opportunistic crime targeting motorists or vehicle passengers continues to be a commonly reported crime. These crimes typically involve males opening unlocked car doors and stealing valuables from victims stopped in traffic. In nearly all cases, victims had the car doors unlocked or the windows rolled down. Burglaries of unattended parked vehicles, to include breaking windows for entry, have also occurred. Belongings have been stolen from hotel rooms, in some cases guests did not properly lock their doors.
- Express kidnappings (where criminals demand a small immediate ransom) involving taxis continue to occur with regularity in Kinshasa, including in the Gombe area. Criminals posing as drivers will pick up fares, threaten them with bodily harm, drive them to another part of the city, and take all their belongings before dropping them off. Most victims are Congolese, as they use shared taxis more frequently than foreigners do.
- DRC police and security personnel sometimes use interactions, such as checkpoints, traffic accidents, or pretext stops, to extort or demand money.
U.S. citizens have been the victims of more serious, violent crime (e.g., armed robbery, armed home invasion, assault), though such incidents are rare compared to petty crime. Victims from the international community sometimes report that assailants posed as police or security agents. Security forces control weapons, leading to widespread speculation that members of the police and military often perpetrate or sanction armed crimes. The U.S. government protects all its official residences in the country with a 24-hour security guard presence.
Small-scale armed disputes, criminality, and lawless behavior prevail throughout the DRC. Reports of violent crime (e.g., banditry, kidnapping, and sexual assault) and attacks by armed groups are common, especially (though not only) in eastern and central DRC. Armed groups frequently act with impunity and in their own self-interest, leading to human rights abuses. The overall security situation in many parts of the DRC is volatile and unpredictable. Large scale violence and armed conflict involving M23 occurs in the southern portion of North Kivu. ISIS-DRC is active causing numerous local casualties in North Kivu and Ituri.
Reports of crime - particularly violent and gun-related crime – are frequent in and around Goma, including by members of the Wazalendo coalition. Incidents predominantly affect locals, and include armed robberies, property destruction, sexual assault, kidnapping for ransom, and murder. The risk of crime greatly increases after dark.
Armed banditry is widespread, particularly along transit arteries between major cities and in remote areas. In North Kivu, armed banditry is extremely common, especially along the road (N2) between Beni and Goma.
The use of public ATMs is risky due to the potential for skimming.
The U.S. Embassy briefs its staff to consider Shegues and Kulunas, local terms for homeless youths and gang members, respectively, as potential threats and to avoid them whenever possible. Shegues are known for begging and crimes of opportunity, particularly petty theft and stealing side-view mirrors off vehicles, including those in active motion. Kulunas are known to operate after dark and are responsible for more violent criminal incidents, often involving the use of machetes as weapons.
Kidnapping Threat
The U.S. Department of State has included a Kidnapping “K” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, indicating that criminal or terrorist individuals or groups have threatened to and/or have seized or detained and threatened to kill, injure, or continue to detain individuals in order to compel a third party (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing something as a condition of release.
Although kidnapping victims are primarily Congolese nationals, there have been abductions of Westerners, including U.S. citizens. The threat of kidnapping is most pronounced in Eastern DRC; however, the threat is present throughout other parts of the DRC. Kidnapping hotposts inclide:
- Eastern DRC: Most kidnappings occur in rural areas during overland travel in North and South Kivu provinces. Increasingly, kidnappings of local residents occur in and around Beni Territory; in certain districts of Goma, along the Bukavu-Walikale road; and especially along the main roads leading from Goma to Butembo.
- Kasais: Kidnappings have previously occurred in Kananga city, Kasai Central.
- Kinshasa: Kidnapping for ransom is rare in Kinshasa, but express kidnapping targeting shared taxi passengers continues to be commonplace.
Armed groups conducted numerous kidnappings in recent years. While not a comprehensive list, some kidnapping examples include the following incidents. On November 21, 2021, five Chinese nationals were kidnapped in Bukavu and on January 7, 2022, three humanitarian workers were kidnapped while traveling on the road between Goma and Kitshanga. On June 16, 2023, armed militants ambushed a humanitarian convoy in Lubero, North Kivu province resulting in the death of a representative from the British charity World Vision. The militants kidnapped two additional aid workers. On November 13, 2023, two aid workers were abducted in Fizi territory, South Kivu province while traveling in a humanitarian convoy.
Terrorism
The U.S. Department of State has assessed the Kinshasa as being a MEDIUM-threat location for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Terrorism “T” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, indicating that terrorist attacks have occurred and/or specific threats against civilians, groups, or other targets may exist.
There are between 15-20 significant armed groups and multiple gangs and illicit smuggling networks operating in the eastern DRC. The Congolese government’s perceived lack of ability to detect and deter terrorism may entice or enable terrorist groups to carry out activities in the DRC. However, the government has taken steps to improve its counterterrorism capacity. The DRC government joined the Global Coalition Against Terrorism during President Tshisekedi’s first trip to Washington in 2019, and has been proactive and cooperative with the international community in initiatives to mitigate terrorism and related activities.
Major military operations are ongoing in the eastern DRC. The Congolese military continues to target the armed groups, criminal gangs, and illicit smuggling networks throughout the country, but focuses mainly on those operating in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu. UN troops continue to undertake offensive military operations against armed groups in Ituri and North Kivu, and conduct protection of civilian patrols in the eastern areas. However, UN troops started a phased withdrawal schedule in December 2023 which will be completed by December 2024. Attempts to disarm and demobilize militias and other armed groups have had limited success; many armed actors enter shifting alliances to fight against local and UN security forces. Travelers in eastern and central DRC should closely monitor local sources for updates regarding Congolese and UN military operations.
ISIS-DRC/Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
President Felix Tshisekedi has publicly described the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) as “terrorists,” and noted they are a threat not just to the DRC but to the entire region.
On March 10, 2021, the U.S. Department of State designated the ADF, which has also rebranded itself as the ISIS-DRC Province, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. ADF/ISIS-DRC, also known as Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen, among other names, is responsible for many attacks across North Kivu and Ituri Provinces in eastern DRC. Under the leadership of Seka Musa Baluku, the group has been notorious in this region for its brutal violence against Congolese citizens and regional military forces, with attacks killing over 1,000 civilians in 2023 alone. June 2024 represented the group’s deadliest month to date, with ACLED recording at least 256 fatalities split between North Kivu and Ituri. In mid-2024, the group expanded its operations to include Lubero territory, North Kivu.
The ADF formally established ties with ISIS in 2018, when ISIS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi first acknowledged the IS Central Africa Province (ISCAP). Before its ISIS affiliation, the ADF had attempted outreach to Islamist terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida for several years. ISIS first claimed responsibility for ADF-attributed attacks in April 2019. The ADF has operated in Beni, North Kivu province for years, and while majority Congolese, it recruits from around Central Africa. In 2024, the ADF was responsible for numerous attacks on civilians, the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC), and UN peacekeepers.
March 23 Movement (M23)
The DRC also designates the March 23 Movement (M23) as a terrorist group and alleges backing from Rwanda. M23 is the largest and most operationally capable militant group based in the North Kivu province. Established in 2012 as a Tutsi ethnically aligned group after the breakdown in the integration process between the FARDC and National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) militants, M23 has been engaged in contesting the FARDC’s territorial control in North Kivu, temporarily seizing control of Goma in late 2012. The 2012 escalation cycle ended with M23’s surrender in November 2013.
Following M23’s surrender, the group entered a period of relative dormancy, significantly decreasing its kinetic operations. However, in 2021 M23 re-emerged, rapidly expanding its territory throughout 2022. In late 2023 to present, M23 has intensified its kinetic activity around Goma, challenging FARDC forces in Sake (located approximately 24 km northeast of Goma) and hindering access to major transportation routes out of Goma. The conflict between the DRC and the M23 has displaced approximately one million people in North Kivu.
On May 3, 2021, President Felix Tshisekedi declared a “state of siege” in the North Kivu and Ituri provinces, citing the need to restore peace and security in the two eastern provinces where decades of armed conflicts and violence have left thousands of people dead and/or forced to flee their homes. The state of siege has remained in place as of December 2024, with a gradual easing of some restrictions in the fall of 2023 to accommodate the general elections.
Political Violence and Civil Unrest
The U.S. Department of State has assessed the Kinshasa as being a HIGH-threat location for political violence directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests.
The U.S. Department of State has included a Civil Unrest “U” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for DRC, indicating that demonstrations, protests, and/or strikes occur frequently, and/or that local law enforcement may have limited ability to respond adequately. Civil unrest can develop quickly without prior notice, often interrupting logistics and services. Avoid demonstration activity, as even those planned to remain peaceful have the potential to turn violent.
Elections/Political Stability
The threat of civil unrest is among the U.S. Embassy’s most prominent security concerns, as the breakdown of civil order could occur at any moment anywhere in the country, including in Kinshasa.
The DRC is one of the poorest nations in the world, and lacks adequate infrastructure for its growing population. Local and national elections can and do drive Congolese to the streets in various forms of protests. Small things like a rise in government-controlled fuel costs can set off large demonstrations. Political and economic factors drive instability throughout the entire country.
The DRC has experienced recurring cycles of political and ethnic conflict; the number, location, and intensity of outbreaks of violence tend to coincide with periods of heightened instability and insecurity. In addition, dozens of armed groups operate throughout large swaths of its eastern and central territory. The longest-running political, economic, and ethnically based violence in the country has been in eastern DRC, where transnational self-interests between the Congolese, Rwandan, Burundian, and Ugandan governments fuel a multi-ethnic struggle over national/tribal sovereignty, the loyalty of local inhabitants, territorial control and land rights, licit and illicit trade routes, and intercommunal grievances.
Examples of recent incidents include:
- Since May 2019, in South Kivu’s High Plateau territories of Fizi, Mwenga and Uvira, fighting between ethnic-Tutsi Banyamulenge groups and Babembe, Bafulero, and Banyindu militias destroyed dozens of villages and displaced over 100,000 people. Intense fighting between armed groups, sometimes resulting in civilian casualties, resumed in March 2021.
- South Kivu has experienced growing violence due to the resurgence of two militia groups: Mai Yakutumba, which carried out attacks in Uvira and Fizi cities and surrounding areas; and a constellation of smaller armed groups under the banner Raia Mutumboki, which have been active throughout the northern part of South Kivu province.
- Ituri has seen a rapid intensification of violence since late 2017, as clashes between Hema herdsmen and Lendu farmers resumed after nearly a decade of dormancy. In early 2018, at least 260 died and more than 200,000 fled their homes due to violence in the region. Violence has continued as Lendu militias have intensified fighting in and around Bunia, Djugu and Mungwalu. Fighting between Congolese military and Lendu militia has affected major roads, mining sites, and villages in the province. In March 2023, Lendu militias organized under the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO) reportedly captured Drodo from Hema herders.
- The three Kasai provinces experienced significant armed conflict from late 2016 to 2019, resulting in mass displacement, the deaths of numerous civilians and individuals associated with the Kamuina Nsapu militia, the execution of many police and security forces, and the murder of two members of the UN Group of Experts in 2017 – one of whom was a U.S. citizen. However, the region has experienced an increase in stability since President Tshisekedi came to power in 2019. The Kamuina Nsapu militia group has disbanded, and the region is more politically aligned with the new administration.
- Reports of increased tension between nomadic Mbororo pastoralists and local communities in northern DRC indicate that the long-simmering situation in this remote corner of the country is worsening. Local politicians, FARDC officers, NGO representatives, religious leaders, and UN officials have all described a deteriorating situation in Bas and Haut Uele Provinces, with the potential for widespread violence.
Protests & Demonstrations
Multiple cities, including Kinshasa and the major economic center of Lubumbashi, experience occasional demonstrations by political opposition parties, students, workers unions, civil servants, and churchgoers. Protests in the eastern DRC have also increased in response to militia instigated violence on civilians and decreasing standards of living. These protests can rapidly become extrajudicial mobs and turn violent, posing a threat to humanitarian aid workers and other personnel operating in the area.
Police have at times responded to demonstrations with heavy-handed tactics including the usage of tear gas and live ammunition to disperse crowds that resulted in civilian casualties and arrests. While the government has increased its capacity to employ non-lethal measures to control demonstrations, and there have been improvements, authorities continue to use lethal force, as documented in numerous human rights reports. Additionally, large demonstrations can impair movement in affected areas and increase vulnerability to crimes of opportunity, including petty theft.
In the lead up to the December 2023 elections, opposition leaders organized a number of demonstrations throughout the DRC and concentrated in Kinshasa and Goma targeting the Independent National Election Commission, CENI, officials and offices. In the post-election space, opposition leaders noted alleged election irregularities and referred to the election as fraudulent. The DRC initiated government bans on particular opposition protests in late December, responding to violations of the ban with lethal police tactics. There was a significant decline in election related protests by mid-January 2024.
In February 2024, Kinshasa witnessed sustained protests targeting Western embassies and UN offices. In response to the uptick in intensity of kinetic activity by the M23 targeting civilians and government aligned forces in the Eastern DRC, demonstrators gathered outside of the US, UK, French, and Belgian embassies protesting the failure of Western states to curb violence in the east and their alleged support of Rwanda (a reported material and financial backer of the M23 rebel group). Protesters burned flags, attacked UN staff and vehicles, and set up makeshift roadblocks.
In May 2024, DRC security forces thwarted a coup attempt in Kinshasa. A group of men armed with machine guns and rifles first attacked the residence of National Assembly Speaker Vital Kamerhe early on May 19, killing a number of guards during a shootout before advancing towards the Palais de la Nation (the president’s official offices). The armed men breached the building but were quickly intercepted by Congolese soldiers. The leader of the coup was killed in the ensuing firefight and the remaining 51 men were arrested and are currently awaiting trial.
Anti-U.S./Anti-Western Sentiment
Adverse sentiment towards visitors relates more to the perceived wealth of the individual than to their nationality.
In February 2024 protests targeting major Western embassies and UN offices took place in Kinshasa in response to growing insecurity in Eastern DRC. Protesters claimed Western states and the UN failed to curb increasing violence by militias in the east, most notably M23, and accused western states of supporting Rwanda (a reported material and financial backer of M23).
Law Enforcement
There is no functional national emergency response number. Emergency and security services emergency contact information are not readily available. Police assistance is usually requested by traveling to the police station and speaking with officers, or by asking the closest officer posted on the streets. Police do not have radios or a communication network. Do not rely on a timely response.
Private U.S. citizens should contact American Citizen Services at the Embassy for emergency support or guidance by calling +243 972 616 193 during business hours or +243 815 560 151 after-hours or emailing ACSKinshasa@state.gov.
In general, the Congolese National Police (PNC) lack capability and professionalism. Military and police personnel are paid a paltry salary (often late, sometimes not at all), are poorly trained, and believed to be responsible for committing criminal acts themselves. Roadblocks are common both inside and outside Kinshasa, especially after dark. Officers often search vehicles for weapons and valuables, and check travelers for identity papers. Security forces regularly seek bribes.
The primary responsibility for law enforcement and public order lies with the PNC, which operates under the Interior Ministry. The National Intelligence Agency, overseen by the presidency, is responsible for internal and external intelligence. The FARDC and the military intelligence service operate under the control of the Defense Ministry, and are primarily responsible for external security but in reality, focus almost exclusively on internal security. The presidency oversees the Republican Guard, and the Interior Ministry oversees the Directorate General for Migration, which, together with the PNC, are responsible for border control. Civilian authorities do not always maintain control over the security forces. Members of the security forces have committed numerous abuses.
Police Response
The ability of authorities to respond to emergency situations is limited, even in major cities. The police force in Kinshasa, and throughout most of the country, is generally ineffectual and dysfunctional. When the police do intervene, they are often ill equipped and poorly trained. Many lack a basic understanding of the law. Consistency in the administration of laws and regulations is absent. Police intervention, legal recourse, and bureaucratic capabilities are limited regarding criminal investigations, prosecutions, and prevention. Many interactions with the police include demands for money, as corruption is rampant.
Due to the limited capacity of Congolese security forces and local police in many parts of the country, communal and ethnic militia (often called Mai Mai), other armed groups, and criminal elements can often act with impunity. Rule of law remains tenuous, especially in remote areas. The government’s inability to control its borders adequately has enabled several armed groups from neighboring countries to operate and seek safe haven within Congolese territory.
Police and military personnel in Kinshasa will stop and detain motorists during road checks to demand bribes. Security forces may engage in criminal activity and/or armed violence. Security forces may erect checkpoints to extort travelers transiting by road, especially outside of major cities. A variety of armed groups may similarly use unofficial checkpoints to exploit travelers. Uniforms worn by members of the security forces may vary, making it hard to differentiate them from other armed actors.
On numerous occasions, security forces have detained and searched declared and credentialed U.S. diplomats, showing complete disregard for international norms and the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Private U.S. citizens detained by the police, intelligence service, or military should make every effort to assert their right to have consular notification made to the U.S. Embassy. Consular access to detained citizens has been delayed and denied in the past. DRC does not recognize dual nationality and will not permit consular access to a dual U.S.-Congolese citizen.
Travelers with Special Considerations
For specific traveler concerns in the DRC, review the local laws and circumstances on the Department of State’s Country Information Page.
Rule of Law, Arbitrary Detention, Official Harassment, Corruption, & Transparency
The U.S. Department of State has not included a Risk of Wrongful Detention “D” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for the DRC.
The law prohibits arbitrary arrest or detention, but the security forces have routinely arrested or detained persons arbitrarily. Police have arbitrarily arrested and detained persons without filing charges to extort money from family members or because administrative systems were not well established. Prolonged pretrial detention, ranging from months to years, remains a problem. Judicial inefficiency, administrative obstacles, corruption, financial constraints, and staff shortages have all caused trial delays. Detainees are entitled to challenge in court the legal basis or arbitrary nature of their detention, but few are able to obtain prompt release and compensation.
Although the law provides for an independent judiciary, the judiciary is corrupt and subject to influence and intimidation. Officials and other influential individuals have subjected judges to coercion.
The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government does not implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engage in corrupt practices with impunity.
Minor immigration violations are sometimes used as reasons to detain U.S. citizens and may appear arbitrary to some. All travelers should ensure their visa and immigration status is current to avoid any reason for detention.
The DRC does not recognize dual nationality. U.S. citizens should always present themselves as U.S. citizens to Congolese authorities so as not to impede the ability to provide consular services.
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity and technology-oriented crime is not as pervasive or sophisticated in Kinshasa as in most other critical-threat locations for crime, but cybercrime is developing. Business email compromise has included phishing and social engineering techniques. The technical proficiency of worldwide actors has improved, making suspicious contacts harder to identify. DRC lacks the resources and technical capability to combat cybercrimes effectively.
Much of the country, to include critical infrastructure, remains vulnerable to cyberattack. Avoid connecting to public Wi-Fi hotspots, as it is difficult to ascertain if the connection is secure. If you must connect to a public Wi-Fi hotspot, use a virtual private network (VPN). Identity theft remains a concern due to several contributing factors: SIM swap fraud, prepaid cell phones, high levels of corruption in many companies and government agencies, and a lack of police resources/expertise to combat this type of crime.
The DRC government has restricted mobile communications, and at times shuts down Internet access during periods of civil unrest or expected political opposition activity. The latest example occurred when the government shut down Internet and SMS text messaging capability nationwide for nearly three weeks in January 2019.
Import/Export Restrictions
The DRC’s rich endowment of natural resources, large population, and strategic location in Central Africa make it a potentially rewarding market for U.S. companies. Businesses in the DRC face numerous challenges, including poor infrastructure, endemic corruption at all levels of government, predatory tax agencies, limited access to capital, a shortage of skilled labor, and difficulties enforcing contracts. The U.S. has sanctioned several Congolese individuals and third-country nationals operating in the DRC in the past. Consult the U.S. Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) for specific information.
A country-specific listing of items/goods prohibited from being exported to the country or that are otherwise restricted is available from the U.S. International Trade Agency website.
Additional resources and reports can be found in the OSAC Traveler Toolkit.
